

**SUBMITTAL TO THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

348



**FROM:** Registrar of Voters

**SUBMITTAL DATE:**  
September 17, 2009

**SUBJECT:** Report on Implementation of Recommendations in the Operational Review of the November 4, 2008 Election

**RECOMMENDED MOTION:** That the Board of Supervisors receive and file the attached report.

**BACKGROUND:** On March 3, 2009, the Board received the Operational, Security & Accountability Review of the November 4, 2008 Riverside County Election & Ballot Process ("Review") performed by Best, Best & Krieger LLP and its Public Policy & Ethics Compliance Group led by former Riverside County District Attorney Grover Trask. The Board directed the Registrar of Voters report back with a full response and implementation of the recommendations within 180 days.

The attached report details the Registrar of Voters implementation of the recommendations.

*Barbara Dunmore*

Barbara Dunmore  
Registrar of Voters

<b>FINANCIAL DATA</b>	Current F.Y. Total Cost:	\$ N/A	In Current Year Budget:
	Current F.Y. Net County Cost:	\$ N/A	Budget Adjustment:
	Annual Net County Cost:	\$ N/A	For Fiscal Year:

<b>SOURCE OF FUNDS:</b>	Positions To Be Deleted Per A-30	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Requires 4/5 Vote	<input type="checkbox"/>

**C.E.O. RECOMMENDATION:**

APPROVE

BY: *Karen L. Johnson*  
Karen L. Johnson

County Executive Office Signature

Dept's Recomm.:  Consent  Policy  
 Per Exec. Ofc.:  Consent  Policy

Prev. Agn. Ref.: 3/3/09 16.3 & 9/1/09 3.133 | District: ALL | Agenda Number:

3.66



**Registrar of Voters  
Report on Implementation of  
Recommendations  
in the Operational Review  
of the November 4, 2008 Election**



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On March 3, 2009, the Board of Supervisors received an Operational Review ("Review") of the November 4, 2008 election conducted in Riverside County. The Review was performed by Best, Best & Krieger LLP ("BB&K") and its Public Policy & Ethics Compliance Group led by former Riverside County District Attorney Grover Trask. The comprehensive Review examined the accountability and security of ballots and voting equipment, compliance with election laws and voting system use conditions, and departmental policies and procedures.

The Review praised the 35 full-time employees of the Registrar of Voters office for operating "...under intense election cycle pressure deadlines with integrity and heroic dedication from top-to-bottom." Fifteen times within the Review it is stated that "No evidence of tampering, misconduct or fraud upon the part of the ROV staff, temporary workers, or volunteer poll workers was found." Moreover, a review of past reports found no actual evidence of tampering, fraud or misconduct.

The Review presented 26 recommendations in response to its findings. Twenty-six of the recommendations were noted as necessary improvements and *best practices* that should be instituted before the next regularly scheduled election on November 3, 2009. Ten additional recommendations were suggested for examination and implementation as soon as possible. The *unscheduled* May 19, 2009 Special Election provided an opportunity for the Registrar of Voters to fully implement 31 of the Review's recommendations and partially implement 4 of the remaining 5 recommendations. The first half of this report details the Registrar of Voters implementation of each recommendation.

The Registrar of Voters enhanced and/or revised procedures to fully comply with all the Secretary of State voting system re-approval conditions. The second half of this report details those improvements.

The implementation of the Review's recommendations has enhanced ballot handling and voting system security through additional documentation and signature verification throughout the entire election process. Revised procedures comply fully with the State's conditions for voting system use. Services to the County's voters have also been improved with technology such as online registration confirmation and polling place look up assistance at precincts.

The Registrar of Voters office conducts all elections with the mission to ensure that the County's electoral process is conducted professionally, consistently demonstrating neutrality and non-partisan decision-making, based upon a thorough knowledge of and compliance with all election laws by administering them timely, responsively and with the utmost integrity on behalf of the County's residents.

## BACKGROUND

On March 3, 2009, the Board of Supervisors received the Operational, Security & Accountability Review of the November 4, 2008 Riverside County Election & Ballot Process (“Review”) performed by Best, Best & Krieger LLP (“BB&K”) and its Public Policy & Ethics Compliance Group led by former Riverside County District Attorney Grover Trask. Tom Courbat, Executive Director of the election integrity group SAVE R VOTE (“SRV”) acted as an *“independent reviewer”* providing *“continuous input and suggestions to the operations review through direct communication with the members of the (BB&K) team.”*

The stated “overarching goal” of the Operational Review was focused on the accountability and security of ballots and equipment used in the election. This goal included review and compliance with election laws, Secretary of State’s voting system re-approval conditions and internal policies and procedures; and finally, providing recommendations for improvement whenever possible.

The first part of this report restates each recommendation followed by the Registrar of Voters (ROV) implementation of each recommendation. The second part of the report discusses compliance with the Secretary of State Voting System Re-Approval Conditions.

## OPERATIONAL REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS

The Review presented 36 recommendations noted as necessary improvements and *best practices* that should be instituted before the next regularly scheduled election on November 3, 2009 to enhance the security, accountability and transparency of the Registrar of Voters (ROV) office and the overall election process. Of the 36 recommendations, 26 are categorized as “Priority 1” and 10 are categorized as “Priority 2.”

Table 1: Definitions of Recommendation Priority Categories

Priority 1	More serious in nature and are required for conformance with applicable laws and policies. They should be implemented <u>before</u> the next regularly scheduled election.
Priority 2	Should be examined and/or implemented as soon as practicable.

An *unscheduled* Statewide Special Election called for May 19, 2009 provided an opportunity for the ROV to implement most of the Review's recommendations immediately.

On March 31, 2009, the Registrar provided a report to the Board of Supervisors stating that 29 (over 80%) of the Review's recommendations would be implemented during the Special Election and more than half of the remaining recommendations would be partially implemented. During the Election, a total of 31 of the recommendations were implemented and 4 of the remaining 5 recommendations were partially implemented.

Table 2: Implementation of Recommendations by Category

Review Recommendations							
Category	Number	Planned Implementation as of March 31, 2009			Actual Implementation during May 19 <sup>th</sup> Election		
		Full	Partial	No Action	Full	Partial	No Action
Priority 1	26	23	3	0	25	1	0
Priority 2	10	6	1	3	6	3	1

The recommendation wherein "No Action" was taken is currently being explored. It requires development of a process for identifying performance levels of poll workers.

The recommendations and ROV implementation on the following pages are organized by Priority Category (i.e. 1 or 2) within each stage of the election process (i.e., pre-election, Election Day, regional collection centers, semi canvassing, and canvass). Various tables, charts, and diagrams are presented throughout the report to highlight relevant information. Additionally, numerous attachments augment the information presented in the body of the report.

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## PRE ELECTION CHAIN OF CUSTODY

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### ❖ PRIORITY LEVEL 1

#### Recommendation

ROV revise existing accountability logs or create new ones that identify serial numbers assigned to various electronic voting system components.

#### **ROV Implementation**


##### Seal Verification Log

Each Accessible Voting Unit (AVU) has 5 permanent seals and 5 election specific seals. Permanent seals are verified prior to an election during the logic and accuracy testing of the AVU. Election specific seals are applied immediately upon completion of testing. Permanent and election specific seal serial numbers are recorded on the Seal Verification Log (please see Attachment A).

##### Voting Equipment Security Log

The ROV adopted a Voting Equipment Security Log (VESL) that tracks all seals applied to each AVU from programming to post-election storage. In addition, the seal number of each VeriVote printer attached to an AVU and the seal placed on the top of the rail which holds the printer is tracked. Please see Diagram 1. Seals labeled A, B, C, D and F are permanent seals.

**Diagram 1: Location of Seals on Electronic Accessible Voting Unit**



Election specific seals (seals E, G and H in Diagram 1) are subsequently applied and their serial numbers recorded. A metal cotter pin is applied to the yellow cap covering the yellow button. Finally, a yellow strap is placed around the AVU's outer protective case under the carrying handle and secured with a padlock serialized seal. The serial number of the padlock seal attached to the yellow strap is also recorded.


The seal numbers are entered into a database used to populate the appropriate fields of the computer generated VESL for each AVU. Please see Diagram 2. The VESL is placed in the Combined Roster and Index M-Z for the AVU's Election Day assigned precinct. Precinct board members are required to record the seal number on the VeriVote printer and the number on the seal applied to the top of the VeriVote rail. (If the printer is replaced during the day, the precinct board must record the replacement seal numbers.)

**Diagram 2: Voting Equipment Security Log**

VOTING EQUIPMENT SECURITY LOG						
The Precinct Inspector and/or Precinct Board members must complete this form when inspecting the voting equipment security seals. See the instruction on the next page. <b>May 19, 2009 Consolidated Statewide Special Election</b>						
Precinct No: <u>36-640</u> AVU Serial No: <u>41612</u> AVU Yellow Strap Seal No: <u>334491</u>						
AVU Case Bottom Left Screw Seal 433951 <b>(A)</b>	AVU Case Bottom Right Screw Seal 433279 <b>(B)</b>					
AVU Display Back Cover Seal #1 K732954 <b>(C)</b>	AVU Display Back Cover Seal #2 K732956 <b>(D)</b>					
Tamper-Evident Seal 018826 <b>(E)</b>	Reset Switch Seal K732915 <b>(F)</b>					
Polls Open-Closed Yellow Seal <i>(Election Eve and Election Morning Only)</i> 0068845 <b>(G)</b>	Polls Open-Closed Red Seal <i>(Cannot be verified before opening of Polls Election Morning)</i> 0031196 <b>(H)</b>					
Record VeriVote Seal # <b>(I)</b>	Record VeriVote Rail Seal # <b>(J)</b>					
Record VeriVote Replacement Seal #	Record Replacement VeriVote Rail Seal #					
ACCESSIBLE VOTING UNIT SEAL LOG						
Activity	Time	Seals Intact?	Verifier Name	Verifier Initials	Verifier Name	Verifier Initials
Election Eve Verification						
Election Morning Verification						
Election day Verification by Range Inspector						
Close of Poll Verification						
If the seal is not intact, or there are any signs of suspected tampering, take the unit out of service and contact the Range Inspector. If you can not reach your Range Inspector, call ROV immediately at (877) 663-9906 or (951) 486-7330.						
Registrar of Voters, 2720 Sycamore St., Riverside, CA 92507, Tel: (951) 486-7330 FAX: (951) 486-7335						

All seals are verified election eve and three times during Election Day; including once by the Range Inspector. Chart 1 displays the rate of completion of the VESL during the May 19<sup>th</sup> election. An AVU is immediately taken out of service if any of its seals show signs of tampering, are missing, or do not match the serial numbers in the VESL.

**Chart 1: Precinct Inspector Completion of Voting Equipment Security Log (VESL) by Time of Day during the May 19th Special Election**



### Equipment Delivery Receipt

Companies transporting election equipment to polling places are provided equipment delivery receipts. Each computer generated receipt contains a list of the equipment to be delivered, the AVU serial number and the yellow strap's seal number which secures the AVU's protective outer case. Upon delivery of the voting equipment, the recipient of the equipment must verify (and initial) that the yellow strap's seal is intact and that the padlock seal serial number is the same as the number printed on the receipt. If the AVU serial number and/or the serial number of the yellow strap's padlock seal do not match the printed receipt, the delivery is refused and the equipment returned to the ROV.

### Post-Election

All permanent seals on the AVUs are verified after each election and documented in the post election section of the Seal Verification Log.

### **Recommendation**

*ROV develop a procedure or system to notify the recipients of voting system components prior to delivery by the transport company. The ROV transport company could assign exact times or a window of time in which recipients could expect delivery. A day before delivery, the ROV transport company could have an automated system contact recipients reminding them of their assigned delivery time or window and provide a phone number should recipients be unavailable to receive voting system components.*

### **ROV Implementation**


#### **Contracts**

The ROV contracts with four transportation companies to distribute to and pickup voting equipment and election supplies from polling places. Each company is assigned a region within the county and is responsible for making advance contact with the recipient of the equipment at each site to establish mutually agreeable delivery and pick up times. The companies are instructed to reconfirm delivery and pick up times not more than 48 hours prior to the scheduled time(s).

The contracted companies are provided additional compensation for each redelivery or pick up attempt if the scheduled delivery or pickup was unsuccessful. Contracts for the May 19<sup>th</sup> election incorporated a provision limiting compensation for extra delivery or pick up attempts to no more than 5% of the company's total deliveries and pick ups unless confirmation is provided that the company contacted the polling site and confirmed the delivery/pick up not more than 48 hours before the scheduled time.

Reported redelivery and pick up attempts reduced from an average of 7.3% in November 2008 to an average of 2.0% in May 2009. Two companies did not report any additional delivery attempts in May.

**Chart 2: Percentage of Redelivery or Pick-up Attempts by Area Served**



**Recommendation**

*ROV develop a more secure method of transporting voting system components. While the Edge voting units are self-contained in a hard plastic portable case and secured with a yellow strap, the strap merely detects tampering but does not really prevent tampering. We were pleased with how the Orange County Registrar of Voters transported voting system components in steel cages containing combination locks. A similar system would further guard against unauthorized access to voting system components. This is especially crucial if voting system components are stored in secured locations in plain view.*

**ROV Implementation****Background**

Condition 12 of the Secretary of State's Conditional Re-Approval of Use of Sequoia Voting System, dated October 25, 2007, requires jurisdictions secure voting system components in uniquely serialized, tamper-evident container(s) before transferring custody to a poll worker, drayage company or other intermediary, or before jurisdiction personnel deliver them to a secure polling place. The same requirements apply to voting equipment not returned to the jurisdictions headquarters on election night. Condition 12 lists the following examples of acceptable tamper evident containers:


- A uniquely serialized, sealed banker's bag;
- A zippered nylon or canvass bag or case on which the zipper(s) that prevent access to the voting system component(s) inside are kept closed by a uniquely serialized tamper-evident lock; or
- A hard lid that blocks access to all doors, ports or other points of access to the inside of the voting system component(s) and that is held in place by a latch or latches closed by a uniquely serialized, tamper-evident lock or locks.

The ROV satisfies Condition 12 by latching in place the AVU's hard lid belonging to the unit that forms a protective outer case. A yellow strap is placed around the AVU's outer protective case and under the carry handle. The poly strap is 9/16" in width with an 80 lb. tensile strength. The strap is sealed with plastic tamper-evident serialized padlock seal.

**May 19, 2009 Election**

The shortened lead time for the May 19<sup>th</sup> election did not allow for thorough research or securing additional resources to implement a solution comparable to Orange County's.

During the May 19<sup>th</sup> election, the ROV continued to use a yellow strap placed around the AVU's outer protective case. A sturdier serialized padlock seal replaced the plastic seal used in prior elections to secure the strap. The padlock seals are sequentially numbered and have a double scored hasp. Once the seal is broken, it cannot be repaired or reused making tampering evident. Please see Diagram 3.

**Diagram 3: Strap and Seal used in May 19, 2009 Election**

Close up of padlock seal.

AVU with yellow strap and padlock seal.

The serial number of the padlock seal applied to the yellow strap is recorded on the voting unit's Seal Verification Log. Seal numbers recorded on the Seal Verification Log are entered into a database used to populate the appropriate fields of the computer generated Equipment Delivery Receipt provided to the ROV's contracted transportation companies and the Voting Equipment Security Log (VESL) placed inside the Combined Roster and Index M-Z for each precinct.

The Equipment Delivery Receipt contains the AVU serial number and the yellow strap's padlock seal number which secures the AVU's protective outer case. Upon delivery of the voting equipment, the recipient of the equipment must verify (and initial) that the yellow strap's padlock seal is intact and that the serial number is the same as the number printed on the receipt. If the AVU serial number and/or the serial number of the yellow strap's seal do not match the printed receipt, the delivery is refused and the equipment is returned to the ROV. None of the units' straps or seals showed signs of breakage or tampering when examined prior to accepting delivery at polling locations for the May 19<sup>th</sup> election. Additionally, all padlock seal serial numbers matched those printed on the Equipment Delivery Receipt.

Prior to setting up the voting unit on election eve, the precinct board members must verify the AVU serial number and the yellow strap seal number provided on the VESL. If either of the numbers does not match or there are any signs of tampering, the precinct board is directed to call the ROV immediately for further instructions. None of the units' straps or seals showed signs of breakage or tampering when examined by poll workers during election eve set up on May 18<sup>th</sup>.

The yellow strap material is purchased in 1000' rolls for \$ 39 each. Each unit is sealed with 4'7" of strapping requiring approximately 8 rolls of strapping material (to secure the units outgoing and returning) for a countywide election. The padlock seals are purchased for 15 cents each. Estimated cost for a countywide election is less than \$1,000.


The ROV surveyed the other 21 California counties using Edge units to determine their methods for securing Edge units at during transport and at polling

facilities. The survey yielded six responses. Of those, five counties (Monterey, San Bernardino, Sutter, Glenn, and Santa Cruz) employ basically the same security method as Riverside—a moderate tensile strength strap secured by a tamper evident seal.

#### Orange County's Steel Transportation Cages

Orange County uses the eSlate® by Hart InterCivic for polling place voting. It is the only current conditionally-certified electronic voting system that can be fully deployed at polling places for voting in California. Orange County deploys between 6 and 12+ eSlates® to each polling place. The units are transported in steel cages secured with combination locks (see Diagram 4). Due to the weight of the cage and equipment, moving the cages from transport to polling place requires the use of a forklift or pallet-jack.

**Diagram 4: Steel Cage Used by Orange County to Transport Voting System Equipment to Polling Places**



#### Other Security Enhancement Options for Transporting Voting System Components

##### ***Option A: Steel Cabinet***

Riverside County uses the Sequoia voting system and is limited to one electronic AVU per polling place per the Secretary of State's conditional certification. The primary mode of voting at polling places in Riverside is on a paper ballot.


The ROV deploys 1 electronic AVU, 5 standard voting booths, 1 accessible voting booth, a voting card activator, and a ballot box to polling places for Election Day.

Precinct specific items including rosters and blank ballots are given to Precinct Inspectors upon completion of training and carried by them to the polling place on election morning. Steel cabinets are available for securing and transporting the AVU and most other precinct supplies to polling locations.

Election suppliers also carry a variety of steel cabinets ranging from \$1500 to \$2500 each (see Diagram 6). At least 850 steel cabinets would be required to supply all polling places in a countywide election. Estimated cost \$1,275,000 to \$2,125,000 (without tax and S&H).

A major concern of the ROV is storage of the cabinets between elections. In addition the weight of the cabinets, 400+ lbs. may require a forklift to load and off load the cabinets onto transportation trucks.

**Diagram 5: Examples of Steel Election Supply Transport Cabinets Available from Election Suppliers**



Dimensions 67" h x 64" w x 26" d - Wt. 450 lbs.    Dimensions 67" h x 40" w x 26" d - Wt. 400 lbs.


***Option B: Single Unit Transport Bags***

Transport bags designed to carry a single voting unit are available. The bags enclose the entire voting unit and can be secured with a key, keyless, or combination lock. They typically have rolling wheels for ease of movement, but this can also aid in theft. Single unit transport bags from manufacturers specializing in election supplies range from \$100 to \$250 each (see Diagram 6).


Santa Clara purchased luggage type bags from a Chinese manufacturer for \$20 each to transport their Edge units in. They secure the zipper with a tamper evident seal. However, after less than a handful of elections, the ROV reports the bags are falling apart and they are looking to replace them.

At least 850 bags would be required to supply all polling places during a countywide election. Estimated cost \$85,000 to \$212,500 (without tax and S&H)

**Diagram 6: Examples of Single Unit Transport Bags**



Transport bag with separate printer bag on top.




Self-contained transport bag.

**Option C: Enhanced Security Strap**

Sturdier straps made from materials such as thick polypropylene webbing and cut resistant steel aircraft cable cords, buckles manufactured from hardened aircraft aluminum, equipped with weather-resistant cam locks are available beginning at \$125 each (see Diagram 7). A minimum 850 straps would be needed for a countywide election at a minimum cost of \$106,250 (without tax and S&H).

**Diagram 7: Example of Enhanced Security Strap**



### **Recommendation**

*ROV increase its efforts to locate locked storage locations outside plain view for all voting system components. While many of the precinct locations are secured, storing voting system components in plain view increases the chances of unauthorized access.*

### **ROV Implementation**


The ROV increased efforts during the May 19<sup>th</sup> election to store voting equipment in locked locations and outside of plain view.

Each facility to be used as a polling place is mailed a Polling Place Selection/Confirmation letter. The letter was modified for May 2009 to include instructions (in red font) that the facility store the electronic voting unit(s) in a secure area out of plain view and not accessible to the public prior to and after Election Day (see Attachment B). Additionally, the Equipment Delivery Receipt was modified to contain similar instructions and requires the storage location of the voting equipment be written on the receipt (please see Chart 3).

Voting equipment stored out of plain sight increased 16% in May; and conversely, voting equipment stored within sight decreased 16%. Residences accounted for 8% of polling locations in November 2008 and May 2009.

Utilization of locked storage for voting equipment within polling locations can present challenges during election eve set up and election morning if the “holder of the key” is not present, does not arrive timely, or cannot be found. A secure, unlocked storage location out of plain view is preferable for voting unit storage. The verification of the integrity of the yellow security strap and serial number on the padlock seal is designed to indicate tampering, if any. In addition, all tamper-evident seals are verified beginning during Election Eve set up through final post-election equipment inspection.

**Chart 3: Voting Equipment Storage Locations at Polling Locations prior to November 4, 2008 and May 19, 2009 Elections**



**Recommendation**

ROV revise existing accountability logs or create new ones that identify specific serial numbers assigned to various voting system components. For example, the Orange County Registrar of Voters identifies eight different serial numbers on its JBC Chain of Custody Log and requires that an inspector and clerk initial all of the serial numbers identified are intact.

**ROV Implementation**

The ROV adopted a Voting Equipment Security Log (VESL), similar to Orange County's JBC Chain of Custody Log, used in the May 19<sup>th</sup> election to verify and track the serial numbers of tamper-evident seals applied to each AVU from programming to post-election storage. (The VESL is presented in Diagram 2.) The seals consist of 5 permanent seals and 5 election specific seals. Verification of the seals occurs 6 times during the election process. Below is a list of times the seals are verified and the parties responsible for verifying the seals. Table 1 presents the rate of completion of the VESL by time of day.

**PRE-ELECTION**

Logic and Accuracy in Warehouse – ROV staff  
Election Eve Set Up – Precinct Inspector and Precinct Member

**ELECTION DAY**

Election Morning – Precinct Inspector and Precinct Member  
Mid Day – Precinct Inspector and Range Inspector  
Close of Polls - Precinct Inspector and Precinct Member

**POST-ELECTION**

Equipment Inspection – ROV staff

**Table 3: Completion of Voting Equipment Security Log (VESL) by Time of Day**

<b>Time of Day</b>	<b>Complete</b>	<b>Partially Complete</b>	<b>Not Done</b>
<b>PRE-ELECTION</b>			
Warehouse L & A	100%	0%	0%
Election Eve	96%	2%	2%
<b>ELECTION DAY</b>			
Election Morning	97%	2%	1%
Election Day	92%	4%	4%
Close of Polls	87%	5%	9%
<b>POST-ELECTION</b>			
Equipment Inspection	100%	0%	0%

**Recommendation**

Seal should bear some sequential numbering or barcodes so they cannot be used in subsequent elections. This would require the logging of the series of numbered seals used each election. For example, if in the year June, 2008 election seal numbers 4000 to 9000 were either used or not returned to the ROV, then for the next election, seal numbers 9001 to a previously designated ending seal number would be used.

## **ROV Implementation**

The ROV issued a specific number range of sequentially serialized seals for the May 19<sup>th</sup> election. The seals were logged and tracked and replacement seals issued and used were also within the assigned number range. In future elections, after exhausting the current inventory of seals, the ROV will vary the color and types of seals used in different elections to make any carry over use more immediately apparent.

### **Recommendation**

*The following additional measures be added to improve existing tamper controls for polling locations:*

- *When possible, utilizing locked storage within polling locations;*
- *Limiting and logging access to electronic voting system components to ROV staff, volunteers, and agents.*

## **ROV Implementation**

The Polling Place Selection and Confirmation letter mailed to facilities selected to serve as polling places was modified for May 2009 to include instructions (in red font) that the facility store the electronic voting unit(s) in a secure area out of plain view and not accessible to the public prior to and after Election Day (see Attachment 3). Additionally, the Equipment Delivery Receipt was modified to contain similar instructions and requires the storage location of the voting equipment be written on the receipt. Please see Chart 3.

Voting equipment stored out of plain sight increased 16% in May; and conversely, voting equipment stored within sight decreased 16%. Residences accounted for 8% of polling locations in November 2008 and May 2009.

Utilization of locked storage for voting equipment within polling locations presents challenges during election eve set up and election morning if the "holder of the key" is not present, does not arrive timely, or cannot be found. A secure, unlocked storage location out of plain view is preferable for voting unit storage. The verification of integrity of the yellow security strap and serial number on the padlock seal will indicate tampering, if any. In addition, all tamper-evident seals are verified beginning during Election Eve set up through final post-election equipment inspection.

Once voting equipment is delivered and stored at a polling place, it does not need to be accessed again until Election Eve, except in rare instances. Polling facilities are instructed to ask for credentials of anyone seeking access to the voting equipment before Election Eve and to call the Registrar of Voters office to obtain approval prior to permitting access to the equipment. See Attachment B.

**Recommendation**

*The following additional measures be added to improve existing tamper controls for interim storage locations:*

- *Use accountability log with signature verification of those who enter and exit storage rooms or some type of magnetic card reader program;*
- *When possible, utilizing alarm systems and interior and exterior surveillance.*

**ROV Implementation**

Two of the ROV's contracted transportation companies (G & H Moving & Storage in Hemet and Command Relocation in Thousand Palms) may store voting equipment temporarily at their facilities immediately prior to delivery to polling places.

In November 2008, G & H Moving & Storage was equipped with two security cameras to monitor and record access to storage areas.

A security review of Command Relocation's storage facility was performed by the ROV and the Facilities Management Department. Since the November 2008 election, the facility is equipped with video and manned surveillance. Both agencies determined that the storage at this site is comparable to the security provided at the ROV facility.

Transportation companies are directed to store voting equipment in a secure, locked office or area when delivery attempts are unsuccessful.

**Recommendation**

*ROV develop a written policy requiring that ROV staff train inspectors on the need for immediate notification should a seal break prior to the opening of the polls, or if there exists evidence of tampering, or any suspicion of tampering, or any paper ballot box after the box has been sealed with the paper ballot inventory standard seal prior to the opening of the polls.*

**ROV Implementation**

The ROV implemented Departmental Policy and Procedure C-23 "Reporting Broken Seals on Voting Equipment or Ballot Boxes and Suspicion or Evidence of Tampering" directing notification to the ROV when there is any indication of, or suspicion of, tampering with voting equipment or materials (see Attachment C ). Precinct and range inspectors are instructed on the need for immediate notification and removal from use of any equipment or election materials exhibiting evidence of tampering.

The ROV has also discontinued the use of paper adhesive seals to seal unvoted boxes of ballots issued to precinct inspectors. Unvoted ballot boxes are now sealed with sturdier vinyl seals to minimize breakage during normal transport.

**Recommendation**

*ROV develop a secondary control policy to address circumstances where the ballots arrive during the set up for the opening of the polls with a broken seal or where there has been evidence of or a report of some tampering, or some form of misconduct or fraud.*

**ROV Implementation**

The ROV implemented Departmental Policy and Procedure C-23 "Reporting Broken Seals on Voting Equipment or Ballot Boxes and Suspicion or Evidence of Tampering" directing poll workers and range inspectors how to handle broken seals on unvoted boxes of ballots or where there is evidence or a report of potential tampering or fraud. Please see Attachment C. Procedure C-23 also contains actions required by ROV personnel in responding to such reports.

**Recommendation**

*ROV develop a written policy requiring that ROV staff train transport drivers on the need for immediate notification to the ROV should they detect evidence of tampering, or any suspicion of tampering, of any voting system component during any phase of delivery and transfer.*

**ROV Implementation**

The ROV developed Departmental Policy and Procedure D-18 "Procedure For Transporting Voting Equipment and Supplies" requiring ROV to staff train transport drivers to immediately notify the ROV if they detect any evidence of tampering or suspected tampering with any voting system component at any time (see Attachment D). The receiving party of the voting equipment and supplies must verify in writing that the AVU yellow strap and padlock seal are intact and the padlock's serial number matches the serial number on the Voting Equipment Delivery Receipt and that there is no apparent evidence of suspected tampering.

**Recommendation**

*ROV should develop a Departmental Policy and Procedure which instructs ROV staff to take very specific actions upon knowledge of tampering or suspected tampering.*

**ROV Implementation**

The ROV developed Departmental Policy and Procedure C-23 "Reporting Broken Seals on Voting Equipment or Ballot Boxes and Suspicion or Evidence of Tampering" that instructs staff and poll workers to take specific actions upon knowledge of tampering or suspected tampering (see Attachment C).

**❖ PRIORITY LEVEL 2****Recommendation**

*Oath of office [sic] be administered to facility managers/ owners of polling places in order to ensure that they understand the magnitude of their responsibilities.*

**ROV Implementation**

The Oath of Allegiance has been added to the Polling Place Selection/Confirmation Letter sent to owners/managers of selected facilities. In addition, the Oath is contained on the Voting Equipment Delivery Receipt that is signed by the individual accepting the election equipment at the facility.

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**ELECTION DAY: FROM OPENING TO CLOSING POLLING LOCATIONS**

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**❖ PRIORITY LEVEL 1****Recommendation**

*More interactive or hands-on training be incorporated into existing training efforts with an emphasis on reconciliation and voter assistance.*

**ROV Implementation**

In preparation for the May 19<sup>th</sup> election, Precinct Officer training was increased from 2 hours to 2.5 hours. The additional time was dedicated to new procedures and the new Voting Equipment Security Log (VESL) and its importance. After an overview, Precinct officers were put in groups and required to identify all seals and the appropriate space the information should be recorded on the VESL. Additionally, all precinct officers were provided a red transport bag and allowed the opportunity to review the key supplies inside the bag. All officers practiced placing a security chamber seal on the bag.

Precinct inspector classes consisted of an in-depth review of their duties including how to process voters throughout the day, how to process paper and electronic provisional voters, how to properly complete each box (A-V) of the Ballot Statement, the precinct posting, the provisional envelope, and a review of the closing procedures page to ensure all required items would be returned to the collection center.

**Recommendation**

*ROV should continue to take steps towards making the reconciliation process more simplified.*

**ROV Implementation****November 2008**

November 2008 was the first time the County deployed two-card ballots (an A and B card with voting positions on front and back) since switching to paper ballots at the polls in February 2008 and since the change from Mark-A-Vote paper ballots to Sequoia Optech paper ballots in November 2007. Coupled with an expected 80 percent turnout, the ROV endeavored to develop a program to simplify the Ballot Statement and effectively train precinct officers to properly complete the reconciliation of ballots recorded on the precinct Ballot Statement.

The Ballot Statement was redesigned for November 2008 while continuing to comply with Elections Code §14405 that reads:

*(a) The members of the precinct board shall account for the ballots delivered to them by returning a sufficient number of unused ballots to make up, when added to the number of official ballots cast and the number of spoiled and canceled ballots returned, the number of ballots given to them. The officers receiving returned ballots shall compel this accounting.*

*(b) The precinct board shall complete the roster as required in Section 14107, and shall also complete and sign the certificate of performance prescribed in Section 15280, if that section applies.*

Ballot Statements used in February and June 2008 continued the practice of detailed tallying and accounting of roster signatures. That practice was implemented when electronic voting was the primary mode of voting in precincts. With the switch to paper ballots, Elections Code §14405 specifically requires a *physical* accounting of the ballots. A reconciliation of the number of signatures on the roster with the number of ballots recorded on the Ballot Statement is a task of the official canvass conducted after Election Day per Elections Code §15302(b).


The revised Ballot Statement combined the number of signatures in all rosters into one data entry element on the statement instead of the previously required ten data entries. Data entry boxes to record the number of additional ballots issued to the precinct during Election Day and the number of Vote-by-Mail ballots dropped off by voters were added. In addition, a more detailed accounting of provisional ballots is required. See Table 4. Data entry boxes on the Ballot Statement where entries should agree are color-coded and identified as "Should Agree" as a secondary check for precinct officers.

**Table 4 : Data Entry Elements Deleted and Added to Redesigned Ballot Statement for  
November 4, 2008 Election**

Deleted from Ballot Statement	Added to Ballot Statement
<b><i>Electronic Roster Accounting</i></b>	<b>Regular Ballots Issued</b>
<i>Electronic Signatures in Combined Roster and Index A-L (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters)</i>	The Number of additional ballots issued during day (to precinct)
<i>Electronic Signatures in Combined Roster and Index M-Z (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters)</i>	Total Number of Electronic and Paper Regular ballot signatures in "Combined Roster and Index" A-L, M-Z. (Include signatures from the Supplemental Active Voter Roster List, Authorized Voter List, and Curbside Voters List)
<i>Electronic Signatures in Curbside Voter Roster</i>	<b>Provisional Ballots Issued</b>
	The number of Provisional Ballots Issued – County "A" card only
<i>Electronic Signatures in Authorized Voters Roster</i>	The number of Provisional Unused ballots – County "A" card only (Place in White Box)
Total of Above	The number of Spoiled Provisional Ballots
<b><i>Paper Roster Accounting</i></b>	
<i>Paper Signatures in Combined Roster and Index A-L (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters)</i>	The number of Blue Provisional envelopes (Voted) (Place in labeled bag and into the red bag)
<i>Paper Signatures in Combined Roster and Index M-Z (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters)</i>	The number of Dropped Off Vote-by-Mail ballots from inside the ballot box
<i>Paper Signatures in Curbside Voter Roster</i>	
<i>Paper Signatures in Authorized Voter List</i>	
Total of Above	

The ROV agreed to provide every precinct inspector with an *Optional* Supporting Worksheet developed by SAVE R VOTE to assist with completion of the Ballot Statement. The *optional* Worksheet consisted of 14 data entry boxes solely for signature accounting (see Attachment E). Out of 721 precincts, 54 precincts attempted to use the *optional* Worksheet. There were 47 returned fully completed (not accounting for accuracy) and 5 partially completed. See Chart 4 Return Status of Optional Supporting Worksheet for Ballot Statement from the November 4, 2008 Election. However, 100% of required Ballot Statements were completed.

**Chart 4: Return Status of Optional Supporting Worksheet for Ballot Statement from the November 4, 2008 Election**



Additionally for November 2008, the ROV implemented a “Closer Program.” The precinct inspector and a precinct officer were identified as “Closers” for their precinct. The Closers were responsible for ensuring completion of the precinct closing documents, including the Ballot Statement, and that all closing procedures were performed correctly. The Closers received an additional 30 minutes of interactive, hands-on training to learn the associated duties. Closers were paid an additional stipend for taking on these responsibilities. The Closers took their responsibilities seriously and spent extraordinary time on reconciliation resulting in some precinct officers departing before completion. During post-election Range Inspector debriefing meetings, Range Inspectors reported that in a few cases Closers took up to 2 hours to complete the Ballot Statement at the polls making every effort to ensure it was completed accurately. Tens of thousands of ballots remained at the Collection Center(s) while workers awaited ballot delivery from these precincts before transporting all the ballots to the central counting site.

#### May 2009

In preparation for the May 19<sup>th</sup> election, the Ballot Statement was converted to a two page document. The two pages were laid out side-by-side in the M-Z Roster. The Ballot Statement Instruction Sheet (left-hand page) contains step-by-step instructions on how to accurately complete the Ballot Statement (right-hand page). Each instruction is labeled with a letter that corresponds to the data entry box on the Ballot Statement for clarity (see Attachment F). Ballot

Statements completed correctly during the May 19, 2009 election improved significantly.

A single card ballot, projected lighter turnout, and revised Ballot Statement resulted in the ROV electing to discontinue the *Closer* program for the May election.

The ROV will continue to take steps every election to simplify the reconciliation process.

### **Recommendation**

*ROV should provide more effective voter assistance through some type of automated services and/or retain additional phone bank operators to field incoming inquiries regarding voter information/registration.*

### **ROV Implementation**

#### **Registration**

“Am I Registered” is an automated voter registration confirmation web application added to the ROV website prior to the May 19<sup>th</sup> election. Voter’s may find out if they are registered to vote by entering their date of birth and the last 4 digits of their driver’s license number or last 4 digits of their social security number.

#### **Vote-by-Mail Ballot Receipt Confirmation**

Voters may confirm the ROV’s receipt of their vote-by-mail ballot via the ROV website. Information on the date a ballot was mailed to the voter and the date (if any) a returned voted ballot envelope was received by the ROV is provided.

#### **Polling Place Look-Up**

Automated polling place lookup is available on both the ROV automated phone system and the ROV’s website.

The ROV also provided each precinct with a polling place look-up CD for use on Election Day. With the use of a laptop computer (provided by a precinct officer) precinct officers can provide voters assistance in locating their correct polling place.

#### **Phone Bank**

The ROV employs trained phone operators beginning 35 days prior to each election to answer voters’ questions. The number of operators is dependent upon the expected voter turnout and interest in the election. Additional phone operators staff a phone bank on Election Day exclusively for calls from polling places—either precinct officers or voters.

#### **Disabled Voters**

The ROV continues to distribute to every precinct officer the “*Through Our Eyes*” DVD developed in coordination with three disability experts suggested by the

Board of Supervisors. The DVD was designed to heighten the precinct officer’s sense of importance of providing accessible accommodations for voters with special needs.


**Recommendation**

*ROV should use different colored envelopes for spoiled provisional ballots and spoiled regular ballots or to identify another process to keep these ballots separate during the closing process.*

**ROV Implementation**

In preparation for the May 19<sup>th</sup> election the ROV printed and began using envelopes that clearly distinguish a “spoiled regular ballot” from “spoiled provisional ballot.” Both envelopes are white, but the printing on the “spoiled regular ballot” envelope is black and the printing on the “spoiled provisional ballot” envelope is blue. Blue was chosen for print on the spoiled provisional envelope because generally all provisional voting materials are blue (e.g., provisional envelope, provisional roster, etc.) are precinct officers associate the color blue with provisional status (see Diagram X)..

**Diagram 9: Revised Spoiled Regular and Spoiled Provisional Ballot Envelopes**



**❖ PRIORITY LEVEL 2****Recommendation**

*Election Officer training courses put more emphasis on providing voter assistance.*

**ROV Implementation**

Voter assistance continues to be emphasized in precinct officer training courses. Precincts are provided supplemental resources and tools to aid with assistance. For example, it is recommended that multiple board precincts located in the same facility appoint a greeter to be placed at the entrance of the voting room to direct voters to their proper voting area. A CD mirroring the ROV web site's polling place look-up is provided to all polling places for use with an election officer provided laptop to assist voters who show up at the wrong precinct.

Precinct officers are trained to permit voter assistance in accordance with Elections Code §14282 whereby a voter may select not more than two persons to assist them with voting (but not the voter's employer or agent of a union of which the voter is a member). Assistance may include, but is not limited to, translation, reading the ballot, marking the voter's ballot or touching the screen at the voter's request.

It is a goal of the Registrar of Voters that every precinct have at least one assigned bilingual Spanish speaking precinct officer. These precinct officers will be identifiable to voters by buttons/badges indicating they speak Spanish. Precinct officers will continue to be trained to assist Spanish speaking voters and will be provided a glossary of Spanish election terms. Posters will inform voters in English and Spanish how a voter may obtain assistance in Spanish.

**Recommendation**

*ROV should continue to emphasize its public outreach and education efforts.*

**ROV Implementation**

During times of constrained resources, the ROV will pursue low- and no cost options for public outreach and education efforts such as cable television opportunities and speaking to community organizations (e.g., rotary clubs, chambers of commerce, schools, etc.). In preparation for the June 2008 Gubernatorial Primary, outreach efforts will focus on educating voters about California's closed primary system and the option(s) for voters not affiliated with a political party to vote a partisan ballot.

**Recommendation**

*ROV should make its training handbooks more users friendly.*

**ROV Implementation**

The Election Officer Handbook has grown with the added complexity of training precinct officers on both paper and electronic voting, as well as provisional voting. The book is been segmented into "Pre-election", "Election Day Morning", "Election Day Morning/Day" and "Election Day Close of the Polls". Tabs are printed on the right-hand side of the handbook pages to denote each section. The training handbook incorporates changes applicable to the specific election. A "What's New" summary of highlights changes at the front of the handbook. Other user friendly guides provided by the ROV are the "Ten Timely Tips" and "What to Do If" pages.

In addition to the Handbook, poll workers are given a DVD with a video demonstrating many of the points covered in the Handbook.

Post-election debriefings with range inspectors provide an opportunity to receive feedback on the handbook and improve its content.

**Recommendation**

*ROV should continue its diligent efforts to educate volunteer poll workers on the importance of prohibiting electioneering near or adjacent to polling locations.*

**ROV Implementation**

Precinct officers are informed that electioneering includes any effort to influence opinion, for or against, an issue or candidate. In accordance with Elections Code §18370, electioneering is prohibited within 100 feet of a polling place on Election Day. In preparation for the May 19<sup>th</sup> election, the ROV included a 100 foot long cord in every precinct's materials to assist precinct officers when confirming electioneering is conducted 100 feet beyond the entrance to the polling place.

Some forms of electioneering are unintentional such as wearing a garment, sticker, pin, etc., depicting a candidate, political party, or measure. If the voter cannot remove the article or cover it before entering the polling place, the precinct officer will provide a cape for voter to wear while voting.

**Recommendation**

*ROV should adopt a process for identifying performance levels of poll workers.*

**ROV Implementation**

A formal process of evaluating election officer performance is currently being developed. Additional resources may be required to achieve this recommendation.

**Recommendation**

*ROV should adopt a system of tracking and monitoring voter complaints.*

**ROV Implementation**

The ROV tracks and monitors voter complaints submitted in writing. A formalized system of tracking and monitoring all voter complaints is being explored. Utilization of the ROV's existing election management system may be an option to record and track voter complaints. Additional resources may be required to implement this recommendation.

**Recommendation**

*Incentive monies should be redirected to improving knowledge retention by the poll workers.*


**ROV Implementation**

A \$50 incentive, or stipend, was paid to the *Closer Team* (one precinct inspector and one precinct officer) of each precinct during the November 2008 election. The *Closers* received 30 – 45 minutes of additional interactive, hands-on training on completion of the precinct closing documents, including the Ballot Statement. Those incentive monies have been redirected to lengthening training for all precinct officers by a minimum of 30 minutes.

Additional stipends are paid for Election Day use of one personal cell phone (\$5) and one precinct officer provided internet accessible lap top computer (\$25) to help voters locate their assigned polling place. Laptop computers no longer require internet accessibility since the ROV is providing each precinct a polling place look up CD. Therefore, the laptop stipend has been reduced to \$15 and the savings redirected to producing the CDs and precinct officer training.

In preparation for the May 19<sup>th</sup> election, an *Inspector's Election Checklist* was developed containing 15 items that Inspectors were responsible for ensuring were completed (see Attachment G). An additional stipend of \$15 was offered and paid to a precinct inspector, if upon verification by the ROV the items were complete. A post election analysis of the *Checklist* demonstrated the program was successful (please see Chart 5) and will be continued in the November 3, 2009 Consolidated Uniform District Election Law (UDEL) election

**Chart 5: May 19, 2009 Completion Status of Inspector's Election Checklist**



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## REGIONAL COLLECTION CENTERS

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### ❖ PRIORITY LEVEL 1

#### **Recommendation**

*ROV utilize a form documenting the transfer of custody of paper ballots and results cartridges from polling locations to collection center volunteers. The ROV has previously used a signature verified form that documented this transfer which it should consider using again.*

#### **ROV Implementation**

The ROV created and used a Collection Center Custody Log during the May 19<sup>th</sup> election. The Log documents the transfer of custody of:

- 1) the voted ballot carton that also contains the AVU results cartridge;
- 2) the unvoted/unused ballot carton;
- 3) the red transport bag that contains the rosters, voted provisional ballots and VBM ballots dropped off at the poll; and
- 4) the number of AVU printers returned (0, 1, or 2).

The precinct officer is required to sign the Log and the time of custody transfer is recorded. The Collection Center driver and driver assistant sign the Log to indicate receipt and transport of the election materials to the central counting site (please see Attachment H). Attachment I contains Departmental Policy and Procedure F-3 "Collection Center – Election Night Procedures"

#### **Recommendation**

*ROV develop an accountability log to document broken seals.*

#### **ROV Implementation**

The ROV developed and used a Collection Center Exception Log during the May 19<sup>th</sup> election. The Log is used to document when a seal is missing or broken on any of the following items: voted ballot carton, unvoted/unused ballot carton, and/or the red transport bag. The Log is also used to document the absence of the AVU printer when it is left at the polling place. The precinct officer signs the Log attesting that the ballots were never out of their custody or control and the Collection Center Inspector counter signs. The unsealed items are resealed with security tape and segregated for inspection at the central counting site.

#### **Voted Ballot Cartons**

On Election Night, May 19<sup>th</sup>, 484 voted ballot cartons were taken to regional collection centers. Of those, 4 (<1%) required resealing because the seal was not properly applied. The remaining 480 cartons arrived with intact seals.


**Red Transport Bags**

Fifty seven (57) red transport bags (12%) arrived at collection centers with broken or missing seals and required resealing on May 19<sup>th</sup>. The following reasons for the unsealed bags were reported to collection center staff.

<i>Seal not properly applied</i>	<b>26</b>
<i>Seal never applied or lost</i>	<b>26</b>
<i>Seal broken at polls</i>	<b>1</b>
<i>Seal broken by poll worker</i>	<b>1</b>
<i>Seal broken in transit</i>	<b>3</b>

The seal required to close the security chamber on the red transport bag can be challenging to insert properly (see Diagram 10).. Each precinct is provided two chamber seals. The second seal is for back up use in the event the first seal breaks or the seal must be broken to add overlooked materials to the bag. During precinct officer training for the May 19<sup>th</sup> election, each precinct officer was provided a red transport bag and white chamber seals to practice properly applying the seal. Reports from precinct officers indicate the hands-on practice was very helpful.

**Diagram 10: Instructions for Applying and Removing Red Transport Bag Security Chamber Lock**



**Recommendation**

*ROV provide instructions for documenting and handling ballot boxes with broken seals.*

**ROV Implementation**

Collection Center volunteers are required to attend 1.5 hours of training on procedures. Prior to the training, volunteers are mailed the Collection Center Procedures handbook and a DVD showing how to operate the collection site as well as how to use the Collection Center Custody Log and Collection Center Exception Log to document and handle broken seals.

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**DELIVERY TO ROV OFFICE AND SEMI-CANVASSING**

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**❖ PRIORITY LEVEL 1****Recommendation**

*ROV document the receipt of the red transport bags by scanning the barcodes as it does with the voted ballot boxes or some other effective process.*

**ROV Implementation**

The ROV developed a Precinct Check Off List for Red Transport Bags Received at the ROV. It is used to document the time a red transport bag arrives at the ROV, the intake staff member's initials, and status of the security seal (i.e., Sealed, Not Sealed, Re-Sealed, Broken Seal). The process is included in Departmental Policy and Procedure F-10 "Receipt and Processing of Red Transport Bags" (see Attachment J).

**Recommendation**

*ROV keep track of those ballot boxes and red transport bags that arrive with a broken seal in an accountability log.*

**ROV Implementation**

The ROV developed and used two check off lists: "Precinct Check Off List for Red Transport Bags Received at the ROV" and "Precinct Check Off List for Ballot Cartons Received at the ROV" during the May 19<sup>th</sup> election. Both Lists are used to document the status of security seals on either the ballot carton or red transport bag from each precinct. The processes and check off list are contained in Departmental Policy and Procedures F-10 "Receipt and Processing of Red Transport Bags" and F-21 "Ballot Intake Procedure," (please see Attachments J and K, respectively).

**Voted Ballot Cartons**

Four (4) of the 484 voted ballot cartons received on Election Night May 19<sup>th</sup> had been resealed at a collection center. The remaining 480 arrived at the ROV with seals intact.

**Red Transport Bags**

Of the 484 red transport bags that were received on Election Night May 19<sup>th</sup>, 417 (86%) were sealed, 57 (12%) had been resealed at a collection center, 6 (1%) were not sealed, and 4 (<1%) had broken seals.

**Recommendation**

*Ballot boxes with broken seals receive a secondary control handling process after they are brought to the attention of the ROV staff.*

**ROV Implementation**

Ballot cartons received at the ROV with broken seals or those that were resealed at a collection center are segregated and undergo an exception inspection to determine if potential tampering or fraud occurred in accordance with Departmental Policy and Procedure F-21 "Ballot Intake Procedure" (please see Attachment K).

Additionally exception inspections are performed on any properly sealed voted ballot carton that is opened on Election Night and is either missing items (i.e., voted ballots, vote results cartridge, or ballot statement) or contains extra items (e.g., provisional ballots, vote-by-mail ballots, precinct posting, voter cards, etc.). On Election Night, May 19<sup>th</sup>, 127 voted ballot cartons (26%) that arrived at the ROV were subjected to the exception inspection process. Of those, 73 were not missing any items, but 69 of the 73 cartons contained additional items. Fifty four (54) were missing at least one of the items. Please see Diagram 11.


**Recommendation**

*The bottom half of the tally room door should remain closed, access to the room should be limited, and all designated personnel with authorized access be required to display identification.*

**ROV Implementation**

The ROV has adopted a policy of keeping the bottom half of the ballot counting room door closed. The open upper half continues to facilitate transparency and permits observers to be within audible range of ballot counting room events.

**Diagram 11: Status of Voted Ballot Cartons Delivered to ROV on Election Night**



Access to the ballot counting room is limited to authorized personnel. Authorized personnel are required to wear an election specific personalized badge authorizing access. Diagram 12 displays the badge worn by authorized personnel during the May 19<sup>th</sup> election.

**Diagram 12: Authorized Tally Room Personnel Badge from May 19<sup>th</sup> Election**




**Recommendation**

*ROV collaborate with appropriate County IT resources to develop a public viewing mechanism of the WinEDS server monitor while ensuring its security. To that end, ROV could position an additional display monitor or monitors in a manner that allows the observers to read the contents displayed on the vote tabulating computer or device while also observing the vote tabulating computer or device and any person or person operating the vote tabulating computer or device.*

**ROV Implementation**

The video output from the WinEDS and WinETP tally computers has been split to provide secondary monitors accessible in the public viewing areas. The monitors have been positioned to permit the public to observe ballot counting operations and the results monitors simultaneously.

**Diagram 13: WinEDS and WinETP Public Viewing Monitors**

**❖ PRIORITY LEVEL 2****Recommendation**

*The drop off and receipt of the elections material to the ROV Office be made more safe and efficient. Safety improvements could include improving the areas of (1) outside lighting, (2) the use of security personnel, (3) the use of a parking lot attendant to direct traffic, (4) the use of safety vests.*

**ROV Implementation**

All four of the above recommended improvements were implemented for the May 19<sup>th</sup> election.

**Recommendation**

*ROV consider placing those working in a supervisory capacity in some type of special vest or identification to improve lines of authority during the massive effort to accept all the election materials.*

**ROV Implementation**

All individuals working in a supervisory capacity are suited in plainly visible and identifiable vests.

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**OBSERVATIONS OF POST ELECTION CANVASSING**

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**❖ PRIORITY LEVEL 1****Recommendation**

*ROV should seek reimbursement from the vendor of the Sequoia voting system for the costs associated with post election auditing required as a condition of recertification. For example, the 100% Manual Tally of electronic ballots may be deemed a post-election audit imposed as a condition of certification.*

**ROV Implementation**

The ROV sent Sequoia an invoice seeking reimbursement for the 100% manual tally conducted for the November 2008 Consolidated General Election and the May 2009 Statewide Special Election. Sequoia has stated they will not pay the invoices since no such provisions are contained in their contract with Riverside County. On March 17, 2009, the Board of Supervisors directed County Counsel to look into possible legal action against the Sequoia and/or the Secretary of State to recover these funds.

**Recommendation**

*With respect to observation areas, the ROV should permit the area to go around the perimeter of the room activity so that all tables can be viewed from a legible distance; provided such an area does not interfere with the ability of the workers to perform their tasks.*

**ROV Implementation**

The ROV enhances public observation areas, whenever possible, to allow for closer viewing of activities. The ROV has a duty to safeguard election materials and maintain the confidentiality of voter information. These responsibilities must be balanced with space limitations.

## SECRETARY OF STATE VOTING SYSTEM RE-APPROVAL CONDITIONS

The Secretary of State's Sequoia Voting System re-approval contains 41 conditions for use in elections in California (see Attachment L). Of those conditions, 20 are the sole responsibility of the local jurisdiction, 4 are shared between the local jurisdiction and the vendor, and 1 is shared among the local jurisdiction, the Secretary of State, and the vendor.

The Review rated 7 conditions as less than compliant and 1 as *unknown*. Table 5 presents these 8 recommendations and their ratings. The ROV is in compliance with all re-approval conditions. Enhancements and/or remedies that required for compliance are discussed below.

**Table 5: Re-approval Conditions rated *less than compliant* by Review**

Condition No.	Responsible Parties	Subject
<b>Partial</b>		
12	Jurisdiction & Vendor	Chain of custody and signature verification; interim storage requirements for voting system components; mechanisms to detect unauthorized access to equipment.
21	Jurisdiction	100% manual tally of ballots cast on electronic voting units
24	Jurisdiction	Security procedures for parties/citizens/media to check and review preparation and operation of vote tabulating devices; attend any or all phases of election; permit observation of vote tabulating computer device from a legible distance.
27	Jurisdiction	Actions in response chain of custody compromise and/or tamper evident seals are compromised
<b>Not Always</b>		
14	Jurisdiction	Inspection of voting equipment seals by public members upon request in a manner that does not interfere with the conduct of the election or privacy of the voter
<b>Need Forensic Audit</b>		
15	Jurisdiction	Precinct posting of vote results from electronic voting units
<b>No</b>		
19	Jurisdiction & Vendor	Jurisdiction shall conduct 100% manual tally of DRE ballots and vendor is required to reimburse the jurisdiction
<b>Unknown</b>		
28	Jurisdiction	Actions required if an electronic voting unit experiences a fatal error

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## **PARTIAL COMPLIANCE**

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### ❖ JURISDICTION AND VENDOR RESPONSIBILITY

#### **Condition 12**

*Chain of custody and signature verification; interim storage requirements for voting system components; mechanisms to detect unauthorized access to equipment.*

#### **ROV Procedures**

The ROV has enhanced chain of custody documentation by requiring signature verification at all stages of custody and transfer of custody. Mechanisms to detect unauthorized access to equipment have been improved.

### ❖ JURISDICTION RESPONSIBILITY

#### **Condition 21**

*100% manual tally of ballots cast on electronic voting units*

#### **ROV Procedures**

This condition requires a 100% manual tally of all ballots cast on an electronic voting unit in use on Election Day by the process described in Elections Code §15360. The ROV performed the tally by the process in EC 15360 for the November 4, 2008 election, and completed the tally of all electronic ballots cast on Election Day by the time the ROV certified the election. The manual tally of ballots cast at early voting sites was not completed until February 2, 2009.

Early voting sites were not established for the May 19<sup>th</sup> Special Election. The manual tally of all electronic ballots cast on Election Day was completed by the time the ROV certified the election.

#### **Condition 24**

*Security procedures for parties/citizens/media to check and review preparation and operation of vote tabulating devices; attend any or all phases of election; permit observation of vote tabulating computer device from a legible distance.*

#### **ROV Procedures**

The ROV adopted security procedures to permit representatives of qualified of political parties, bona fide associations of citizens, and media associations in the ballot counting room during public logic and accuracy testing. Any member of the public may also be escorted into the ROV's warehouse and observe the preparation of AVUs for use prior to an election. The ROV's procedures allow attendance at any and all phases of the election. Dual monitors permit the public to observe the contents of the vote tabulating computer and ballot counting operations simultaneously.

**Condition 27**

*Actions in response to chain of custody compromise and/or tamper evident seals are compromised*

**ROV Procedures**

The ROV formalized past practice with Departmental Policy and Procedures D-20 "Software/Firmware Verification" to comply with this condition. Please see Attachment M.

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**NOT ALWAYS**

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**❖ JURISDICTION RESPONSIBILITY****Condition 14**

*Inspection of voting equipment seals by public members upon request in a manner that does not interfere with the conduct of the election or privacy of the voter.*

**ROV Procedures**

The ROV honors public requests to observe externally visible voting system security seals in a time and manner that does not interfere with election activities and without physical contact of the equipment or seals by the public member(s).

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**NEED FORENSIC AUDIT**

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**Condition 15**

*Precinct posting of vote results from electronic voting units*

**ROV Procedures**

The ROV developed a Precinct Posting form for use by precinct officers. The form requires precinct officers to record the number of ballots cast in the following categories: paper ballots, provisional paper ballots, electronic ballots, electronic provisional ballots, and total of these ballots. All precinct officers sign the form and one copy is to be posted outside the polling place in plain view and the second (duplicate) copy is returned to the ROV. A post-election inspection of polling places has not occurred to absolutely determine how many forms were posted as instructed. However, during the May 19<sup>th</sup> election 455 precincts (94%) returned a completed duplicate copy of the posting to the ROV. It is assumed the original copies were posted at the precincts. Ten precincts returned both copies fully completed and 10 precincts returned blank forms.

This Precinct Posting form was developed to provide useful information to poll watchers, campaigns, and the public. The posting provides the mode of voting (i.e., paper, electronic, provisional, etc.) and voter turnout at the precinct.

To adhere fully to Condition 14 in future elections, the ROV will discontinue use of the current Precinct Posting form (described above). In its place, precinct officers will be instructed to manually transcribe the summary vote results from the voting unit display screen to a (duplicate) reporting form. One copy will be posted outside the polls and the second copy will be returned to the ROV. The posting required by this condition appears to provide minimal useful information and has the potential to compromise the secrecy of ballots if few voters opt to cast their ballot electronically.

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## **NO COMPLIANCE**

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### **Condition 19**

*Jurisdiction to conduct 100% manual tally of DRE ballots and vendor is required to reimburse the jurisdiction*

### **ROV Procedures**

The ROV sent Sequoia an invoice seeking reimbursement for the 100% manual tally conducted for the November 2008 Consolidated General Election and the May 2009 Statewide Special Election. Sequoia has stated they will not pay the invoices since no such provisions are contained in their contract with Riverside County. On March 17, 2009, the Board of Supervisors directed County Counsel to look into possible legal action against the Sequoia and/or the Secretary of State to recover these funds.

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## **UNKNOWN**

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### **Condition 28**

*Actions required if an electronic voting unit experiences a fatal error*

### **ROV Procedures**

The ROV formalized past practice with Departmental Policy and Procedures D-20 "Software/Firmware Verification" to comply with this condition. Please see Attachment M.

Consolidated Statewide Special Election  
May 19th, 2009

3

WA01

**Pre Election Seal Verification Log**

**41563**



Pre Election			Post Election	
<u>AVU Permanent Seals</u>	<u>Seals Verified</u>		<u>Seals Verified</u>	<u>Comments:</u>
Case Seal Left: 433275	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Case Seal Right: 433277	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Display Seal Upper: K731950	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>Verification Signatures</u>
Display Seal Lower: K731952	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	#1: _____ #2: _____
Reset Switch #: K731951	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	Date Verified: _____

<u>Election Specific Seals</u>	<u>Seal Verification Signatures</u>	
Tamper Proof Seal #: <input type="checkbox"/> _____	#1:	_____
RC Red Seal #: <input type="checkbox"/> _____	#2:	_____
Polls Yellow Seal #: <input type="checkbox"/> _____	<u>Logic and Accuracy</u>	
Polls Red Seal #: <input type="checkbox"/> _____	Completed By: _____	
AVU Strap Seal #: <input type="checkbox"/> _____	Date: _____	

**Maintenance Log**

Issue: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Resolution: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Repaired By: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Flash Reloaded By: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Place Removed Permanent Seals Here

**BARBARA DUNMORE**  
Registrar of Voters



2724 Gateway Drive  
Riverside, CA 92507-0918  
(951) 486-7341 • FAX (951) 486-7320  
www.voteinfo.net

**REGISTRAR OF VOTERS  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE**

**SELECTED TO SERVE AS A POLLING PLACE**

August 26, 2009

**Voting Precinct:**

**PPID#:**

Dear ,

This is to confirm that your facility, identified above, has been selected as a Polling Place for the **Consolidated Election**, to be conducted on **November 3, 2009**. By agreeing to let us use your facility as a Polling Place you ascribe to the Oath of Allegiance on the back of this form.

Please take a moment to confirm that we have the correct address for this facility. The address as it appears above, will be published in the Sample Ballot mailed to all Polling Place voters and made available to voters over the phone and on our website. Please advise us **immediately** of any **inaccuracies**.

Within approximately 7 days prior to Election Day, voting equipment will be delivered to your location (upon request, a table and chairs can be delivered). ***For security purposes, the electronic voting unit should be stored in a secure area out of plain view prior to and after Election Day and not accessible to the public.*** Within one week following the election, the equipment will be picked up. The Inspector (lead Pollworker) assigned to your facility will be contacting you to coordinate Election Eve (November 2nd) set up. **Please arrange for the facility to be open on Election Day from 6:15 a.m. until completion of Election Board duties, approximately one hour after close of polls at 8:00 p.m.**

If the Inspector does not contact you, or if you have any questions, please call the Elections Officers and Polls Division of the Registrar of Voters at (951)486-7341 or 1-877-663-9906 (toll free), or Caroline Saucedo at (951)486-7355.

In the meantime, thank you for providing a Polling Place for your friends and community. Your assistance ensures the citizens in your area the opportunity to exercise their fundamental right to vote.

Election Officers and Polls Division  
County of Riverside Registrar of Voters

PS – Please forward a copy of this to the contact person responsible for coordinating Election Eve and/or Election Day facility use.

**NOTE: If anyone requests access to the voting equipment prior to Election Eve or after Election Day, ask for their credentials and contact the Registrar of Voters office at 1-877-663-9906 (toll free) to get approval prior to permitting access to the equipment.**

### **OATH OF ALLEGIANCE**

**I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California; that I will faithfully defend the integrity of the electoral process through the conscientious execution of the duties entrusted to me; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter.**

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**REGISTRAR OF VOTERS  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE**



**BARBARA DUNMORE  
REGISTRAR OF VOTERS**

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**DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES  
AND PROCEDURES**

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**Section No: C-23**

Effective Date:

Revision Date: April, 2009

**Section:** Election Officer and Polls Division

**Subject:** **Reporting Broken Seals on Voting Equipment or Ballot Boxes and Suspicion or Evidence of Tampering**

**Applicable Code Sections:** E.C. §14112 and §14103

**Purpose:** To take immediate and proper measures when voting equipment security seal(s) or a ballot box security seal is broken, or if there is any suspicion or evidence of tampering with ballots or voting equipment.

**Policy:** Any individual who is authorized by the Registrar of Voters (ROV) and assigned to transport, deliver, store, set up, open & close the polls, or collect voting materials and voting equipment before, during, or after an election shall take an Oath of Allegiance and be required to report immediately to the ROV when there is any evidence, or suspicion, of tampering with the paper ballots or voting equipment.

**Procedure:**

Upon reporting any tampering, or suspicion of tampering, with the voting equipment or voting materials, the ROV will take appropriate action to rectify the situation using the following procedures.

**Reporting Broken Seal on Unvoted Ballot Box**

Each box of ballots is sealed with a vinyl seal (Tamper Evident Security Seal) before being given to the Precinct Inspector, which is not to be broken or removed prior to Election Morning. If the seal is broken, or if there is any evidence or suspicion of tampering, the Precinct Inspector (or a Precinct Board member) will call the ROV to report the incident. If the ROV telephone lines are busy, and the ROV staff can not be reached, the precinct Board members can call the Range Inspector. The ROV or the Range Inspector will instruct the Precinct Board members to do the following:

- Inspect the condition of all ballots and verify that none have been voted or damaged  
Note: two Precinct Board members are required to inspect and verify.
- Count to verify the number of ballots and report the result to the ROV over the phone. The ROV will compare the number of ballots counted against the Official Ballot Order Report to confirm that the number of ballots sent to the polling place is accurate.

- If the number of ballots are the same as listed on the Ballot Order Report, and ballots are in good condition, ROV will instruct the Precinct Board members to log the incident in the Election Officers Comment Sheet (pink sheet in the M-Z roster) and provide the reason (if known) and continue to use the ballots in the box.
- If the Precinct Board members notice any voted ballots in the box, the ROV will instruct the Precinct Board members to document the incident on the Election Officers Comments sheet and set the voted ballot(s) aside. The ROV will send replacement blank ballots to the polling place and will take custody of the voted ballot(s) and conduct a thorough investigation and take appropriate actions based on the findings.
- If the box is missing ballots, the ROV will instruct the Precinct Board members to set the ballot box in question aside and document the incident on the Election Officers Comments sheet (the pink sheet). The ROV will send replacement blank ballots to the polling place, take custody of the tampered ballots, conduct an investigation, and take appropriate actions based on the findings.

## **Reporting Broken Seals on Voting Equipment**

### **1. Yellow Strap Padlock Seal**

Each Accessible Voting Unit (AVU) is secured inside a hard plastic case with a yellow strap wrapped around it and secured by a tamper evident serialized padlock seal. The serial number on the padlock seal affixed to the yellow strap is recorded and tracked for security purposes. In addition, permanent seals are affixed to each AVU that are to be inspected and verified by the Precinct Board members on Election Eve (during equipment set up), Election Morning (when opening the polls), during the Election Day (by the Range Inspector) and at the close of the polls.

If a Precinct Board member observes that the padlock seal attached to the yellow strap on the AVU is broken or suspects tampering prior to Election Eve set up, he/she will call the ROV or the Range Inspector and follow their instruction. The incident and any action taken must be documented on the Voting Equipment Security Log Sheet in the M-Z Combined Roster. The ROV or the Range Inspector will instruct the following:

- Inspect all AVU's seal numbers (two persons are required to inspect and verify) to ensure the results cartridge tamper evident seal is intact and the AVU's permanent seal numbers match the recorded numbers on the Voting Equipment Security Log (VESL) provided in the M-Z roster.
- If the tamper evident seal is intact and the permanent seals (Case Bottom Left and Right Screw Seal, Display Back Cover seals # 1 and #2, Reset switch seal) and Polls Open-Closed compartment yellow seal match those recorded on the VESL, continue set up/usage of the AVU.
- If there is any discrepancy between the seal numbers recorded on the VESL and the seals secured to the AVU, set the unit aside. The ROV will send in a replacement AVU and a corresponding VESL and will remove the AVU in question to conduct a thorough investigation and take appropriate action based on the findings.
- Document the incident and any action taken on the Voting Equipment Incident Log Sheet in the M-Z Combined Roster.

## **2. Polls Open/Closed Compartment Yellow Seal**

If during Election Eve set up, a Precinct Board member observes that the yellow seal attached to the Polls Open-Closed compartment is broken, he/she will call the ROV or the Range Inspector who will provide the following instructions:

- Inspect all AVU seal numbers using the instructions in 1. above;
- If all permanent seals match the numbers listed on the VESL and the tamper evident seal is intact, continue usage of the AVU.
- If there is any discrepancy between the seal numbers recorded on the VESL and those secured to the AVU, set the unit aside. The ROV will send another AVU with its corresponding VESL for the polling place to use and will remove the AVU in question to conduct a thorough investigation. Appropriate action will be taken based on the investigative findings. Note: The replacement VESL should be used for verification of the replaced AVU and be kept in the M-Z roster pocket.
- Document the incident and any action taken on the Voting Equipment Incident Log Sheet in the M-Z Combined Roster.

## **3. AVU Permanent Seals and Tamper Evident Seal**

If at any time and during any inspections on Election Eve, Election Morning, and Election Day or at the Close of the Polls, any of the permanent seals are broken, or there is suspicion of tampering, the Precinct Inspector (or a Board member) will call the ROV or the Range Inspector without delay and document the incident and any action taken on the Voting Equipment Incident Log Sheet in the M-Z Combined Roster. The ROV will send in a replacement AVU and a corresponding VESL, and will remove the AVU in question to conduct a thorough investigation and will take appropriate action based on the findings.

### **Reporting Items Found in a Ballot Box**

After the opening of the polls, the 1<sup>st</sup> voter to arrive to cast his/her vote will confirm the "emptiness" of the ballot boxes (the blue and brown empty ballot boxes) and verify that they are sealed and then complete the "First Voter Procedural Check list". If the first person and a Precinct Board member observe any material or ballots in the ballot box, the Precinct Inspector will notify the ROV or the Range Inspector immediately. The ROV or the Range Inspector will instruct the Precinct Inspector to do the following:

- To take custody of the items in the ballot box and set them aside for ROV inspection and proceed to seal the empty ballot box (es) and continue to use the empty box (es) for depositing voted ballots.
- Document the incident in the Election Officers comment sheet (the pink sheet).

The ROV will investigate the incident and take appropriate action depending on the findings.

**Attachments:**

1. Voting Equipment Security Log (VESL)
2. Voting Equipment Security Log Instruction Sheet
3. Declaration of Election Officers
4. Oath of Allegiance
5. First Voter Procedural Check list
6. Instructions for Precinct and Range Inspector

## VOTING EQUIPMENT SECURITY LOG

The Precinct Inspector and/or Precinct Board members must complete this form when inspecting the voting equipment security seals. See the instruction on the next page.  
**May 19, 2009 Consolidated Statewide Special Election**

**Precinct No:** \_\_\_\_\_ **AVU Serial No:** \_\_\_\_\_ **AVU Yellow Strap Seal No:** \_\_\_\_\_

AVU Case Bottom Left Screw Seal <span style="float: right; font-size: 2em;">Ⓐ</span>	AVU Case Bottom Right Screw Seal <span style="float: right; font-size: 2em;">Ⓑ</span>
AVU Display Back Cover Seal #1 <span style="float: right; font-size: 2em;">Ⓒ</span>	AVU Display Back Cover Seal #2 <span style="float: right; font-size: 2em;">Ⓓ</span>
Tamper-Evident Seal <span style="float: right; font-size: 2em;">Ⓔ</span>	Reset Switch Seal <span style="float: right; font-size: 2em;">Ⓕ</span>
Polls Open-Closed Yellow Seal <small>(Election Eve and Election Morning Only)</small> <span style="float: right; font-size: 2em;">Ⓖ</span>	Polls Open-Closed Red Seal <span style="float: right; font-size: 2em;">Ⓗ</span>

Record VeriVote Seal # <span style="float: right; font-size: 2em;">Ⓘ</span> -----	Record VeriVote Rail Seal # <span style="float: right; font-size: 2em;">Ⓙ</span> -----
Record VeriVote Replacement Seal # -----	Record Replacement VeriVote Rail Seal # -----

### ACCESSIBLE VOTING UNIT SEAL LOG


Activity	Time	Seals Intact?	Verifier Name	Verifier Initials	Verifier Name	Verifier Initials
<b>Election Eve Verification</b>						
<b>Election Morning Verification</b>						
<b>Election day Verification by Range Inspector</b>						
<b>Close of Poll Verification</b>						

If the seal is not intact, or there are any signs of suspected tampering, take the unit out of service and contact the Range Inspector. If you can not reach your Range Inspector, call ROV immediately at (877) 663-9906 or (951) 486-7330.

Registrar of Voters 2724 Gateway Dr. Riverside CA 92507 PH: (951)486-7200 FAX: (951)486-7335

# VOTING EQUIPMENT SECURITY LOG INSTRUCTION SHEET

Use the illustrations below to identify the location for all seals that need to be verified and or recorded on the next page during the Election Eve Verification, Election Morning Verification, Election Day Verification and the Close of Polls Verification process. **Be sure to place all used or unused seals in the "SEALS BAG".**



Before opening the Polls, the Inspector and Precinct Officers must sign the following declarations:

**DECLARATION OF ELECTION OFFICERS**  
**E.C. 12321**

State of California }  
County of Riverside } ss.

I do hereby solemnly declare that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office shown after my signature on the Election Precinct Board for the \_\_\_\_\_ Precinct, to the best of my ability, for the election to be held on

\_\_\_\_\_  
DATE OF ELECTION

Signed on this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_ in the presence of:



WITNESS MUST ALSO SIGN

_____ (SIGNATURE)	_____, INSPECTOR	_____ (SIGNATURE OF WITNESS)
_____ (SIGNATURE)	_____, PRECINCT OFFICER	_____ (SIGNATURE OF WITNESS)
_____ (SIGNATURE)	_____, PRECINCT OFFICER	_____ (SIGNATURE OF WITNESS)
_____ (SIGNATURE)	_____, PRECINCT OFFICER	_____ (SIGNATURE OF WITNESS)
_____ (SIGNATURE)	_____, PRECINCT OFFICER	_____ (SIGNATURE OF WITNESS)
_____ (SIGNATURE)	_____, PRECINCT OFFICER	_____ (SIGNATURE OF WITNESS)

Inspector must witness the signature of all Election Officers, including those appointed to fill vacancies, before entering upon their duties. If Inspector is not present such declarations shall be witnessed by any Precinct Officer. If any Election Officer does not appear at the opening of the polls, or is not qualified to act, those voters present, including members of the board, shall appoint a voter to fill the vacancy. The Inspector shall appoint a Precinct Officer to replace any Precinct Officer who ceases to act or becomes incapacitated during the progress of an election. If the Inspector ceases to act, a majority of the remaining members of the precinct board may appoint a substitute.

**FILLED VACANCIES CERTIFICATE**

We hereby certify \_\_\_\_\_ was/were  
Appointed by the Registrar of Voters as Election Officer(s) for said precinct but did not serve as such and that  
\_\_\_\_\_ was/were duly  
appointed as substitute(s) by the qualified electors present at the time for opening the polls.

And, further that during the progress of the election \_\_\_\_\_  
ceased to act or became incapacitated from acting and \_\_\_\_\_  
was/were appointed as substitute(s)



**ATTESTED:**  
\_\_\_\_\_  
INSPECTOR  
  
\_\_\_\_\_  
PRECINCT OFFICER

\_\_\_\_\_  
PRECINCT OFFICER  
  
\_\_\_\_\_  
PRECINCT OFFICER

# Range Inspector Oath and Payroll

## OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

(Required by Chapter 8, Division 4, Title 1, Government Code; Section 3, Article XX, California Constitution)


STATE OF CALIFORNIA }  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE } SS

Each of the undersigned, for himself/herself alone, does hereby take and subscribe to the following oath of allegiance:

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter.

Signature of Range Inspector subscribed and sworn \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 20\_\_\_\_.

Signature \_\_\_\_\_



### PAYROLL

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Mailing Address \_\_\_\_\_

City, State, Zip \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ @ \$10.00 per hour = \$ \_\_\_\_\_ (round up to the nearest 1/2 hour or full hour)  
# of hours

\_\_\_\_\_ @ \$.585 per mile = \$ \_\_\_\_\_  
# of miles

\$20.00 for training + \$ \_\_\_\_\_ + \$ \_\_\_\_\_ = \$ \_\_\_\_\_  
Misc. Expenses \$15.00 for  
(Attach Receipts) Cell phone

Grand Total = \$ \_\_\_\_\_

Auto Insurance Carrier:

Policy #

Coverage  
Period \_\_\_\_\_

### OFFICE USE ONLY

Breakfast \_\_\_\_\_ (Maximum \$7.00)\*

Lunch \_\_\_\_\_ (Maximum \$10.00)\*

Dinner \_\_\_\_\_ (Maximum \$12.00)\*

Total \_\_\_\_\_

\*Itemized receipt must be provided. We cannot accept a credit card receipt as proof for expenses claimed.

**Payroll checks will NOT be issued without supporting documentation for expenses claimed (receipts) AND complete auto insurance information.**

## First Voter Procedural Checklist

California Elections Code 14215, requires that before issuing or receiving any ballots, the Inspector of the Precinct Board must open, exhibit, and close the ballot container(s). The following procedural checklist must be completed by a Precinct Inspector for the "First Voter" that arrives at the Polling Place once his/her eligibility has been established.

**After processing and obtaining all required documentation from the 1st eligible voter, have him/her verify that the blue and brown ballot boxes are empty and sealed. Then walk the voter to the voting units and record the voting unit number on the "Public Counter Verification" section list below. Show the 1st voter the screen of each voting unit and ask him/her to confirm the "0" (zero) in the lower left corner of each screen identified as the "Public Counter".**

<b>Ballot Box Verification</b>	<b>Inspector Initials</b>	
	Yes	No
Ballot Boxes are Empty?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ballot Boxes are Sealed?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<b>Voting Unit Number</b>	<b>Public Counter Verification</b>	<b>Inspector Initials</b>	
		Yes	No
	Does the screen display a zero on the public counter?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

**First Voter:** \_\_\_\_\_ / **05** / **19** / **2009**  
Print Name Signature Month Day Year

**Checklist completed by:** \_\_\_\_\_ / **05** / **19** / **2009**  
Inspector Month Day Year

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**REGISTRAR OF VOTERS  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE**



**BARBARA DUNMORE  
REGISTRAR OF VOTERS**

---

**DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES AND  
PROCEDURES**

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**Instructions for Precinct and Range Inspector**

Precinct Inspectors and the Range Inspectors are required to report immediately to the ROV when there is any evidence or suspicion of tampering with paper ballots or voting equipment or where there has been evidence of or a report of tampering, or some form of misconduct or fraud.

**Report Broken Seal on Unvoted Ballot Carton**

If a precinct Board member calls to report broken or missing seal on an unvoted ballot box before the opening of the polls instruct the following and contact the ROV immediately:

- Inspect the condition of all ballots and determine if any have been voted. Note: two Precinct Board members are required to inspect and verify;
- Count to verify the number of ballots and report the results over the phone. The Range Inspector will contact the ROV to report the number of ballots in the unvoted ballot box. The ROV will compare the number of ballots counted against the Official Ballot Order Report to confirm that the number of ballots sent to the polling place is accurate and that no ballots are missing.
- If the number of ballots are the same as listed on Ballot Order Report, and the ballots are in good condition, instruct the Precinct Board members to log the incident in the Election Officers Comment Sheet (pink sheet in the M-Z roster) and provide the reason (if known) and continue to use the ballots in the box.
- If the Precinct members notice any voted ballots in the box, instruct them to document the incident in the Election Officers Comment Sheet and set the voted ballot(s) aside. Note: After giving this instruction contact ROV right away to report the incident. The ROV will arrange to send replacement ballots to the polling place and take custody of the voted ballot(s).
- If the box is missing ballots, instruct the Precinct Board members to set the ballot box in question aside and document the incident in the Election Officers Comment sheet (the pink sheet). Report the incident to ROV. The ROV will send replacement blank ballots to that polling place and will take custody of the tampered ballot box.

## **Report Broken Seal on Voting Equipment**

**1. Yellow Strap Padlock Seal**-If a Precinct Board member reports the tamper evident padlock seal attached to the yellow strap on the AVU is broken or is missing prior to Election Eve set up, instruct the following:

- Inspect all AVU's seal numbers to ensure the result cartridge tamper evident seal is intact and the AVU's permanent seal numbers match the recorded numbers on the Voting Equipment Security Log (VESL) provided in the M-Z roster as is illustrated and explained in the Voting Equipment Security Log Instruction Sheet. Note: Precinct Inspector and a Board member need to perform the inspection.
- If the tamper evident seal is intact and the permanent seals (Case Bottom Left and Right Screw Seal, Display Back Cover seals # 1 and #2, Reset switch seal) and Polls Open-Closed compartment yellow seal match those recorded on the VESL, continue set up/usage of the AVU.
- If there is any discrepancy between the seal numbers recorded on the VESL and the seals affixed to the AVU, instruct the Precinct Board members to set the unit aside and record the incident and any action taken on the Voting Equipment Incident Log Sheet in the M-Z Combined Roster. The ROV will send in a replacement AVU and a corresponding VESL and will remove the AVU in question to conduct a thorough investigation.

Note: after giving these instructions report the incident to the ROV immediately.

**2. Polls Open/Closed Compartment Yellow Seal**-If during Election Eve set up, it is reported that the yellow seal attached to the Polls Open-Closed compartment is broken, instruct the following:

- Inspect all AVU seal numbers using the instructions above; if all permanent seals match the numbers listed on the VESL and the tamper evident seal is intact, continue set up/usage of the AVU.
- If there is any discrepancy between the seal numbers recorded on the VESL and those secured to the AVU, instruct the Precinct Board members to set the unit aside, record the incident and any action taken on the Voting Equipment Incident Log Sheet in the M-Z Combined Roster, and wait for the ROV to send another AVU with its corresponding VESL for their use.

Note: After giving the instructions contact and inform ROV immediately.

**3. AVU Permanent Seals and Tamper Evident Seal**-If at any time and during any inspections on Election Eve, Election Morning, Election Day or at the Close of the Polls, it is reported that any of the permanent seals are broken, or there is suspicion of tampering, instruct the Precinct Board to:

- Set the AVU aside until an ROV staff member can arrive to remove and replace the AVU with another AVU and a corresponding VESL for their use.

- Record the incident and any action taken on the Voting Equipment Incident Log Sheet in the M-Z Combined Roster.

Note: After giving the instructions contact and inform ROV immediately.

**4. Empty Ballot Box & First Voter Verification-** If it is reported that the first voter and a Precinct Board member(s) observe any material or ballot in the ballot box, instruct the following:

- Take immediate custody of the ballot(s) or materials and set them aside for the ROV inspection.
- Place a seal on the empty ballot box and use it for depositing voted ballots.
- Document the incident in the Election Officers comment sheet (the pink sheet)

#### **Assisting Voters During Circumstances Mentioned Above**

Instruct the Precinct Board members to offer the voters the following options to cast their vote immediately while they are waiting for delivery of ballots in good condition or arrival of a replacement AVU:

- Vote by issuing the voter a copy of the Sample Ballot for that precinct or offer a provisional ballot.
- Direct the voter to the location of a nearby polling place with the same ballot type.
- Direct the voter to call ROV to acquire additional information about other polling places or go to the ROV office to vote if the voter can not use any of the above options.
- Vote electronically on the Accessible Voting Unit (AVU).

**Attachment:** Voting Equipment Security Log Instruction Sheet

**REGISTRAR OF VOTERS  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE**



**BARBARA DUNMORE  
REGISTRAR OF VOTERS**

**DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES  
AND PROCEDURES**

**Section No: D-18**

Effective Date: April, 2009

Revision Date:

**Section:** Internal Services and Election Officers & Polls

**Subject:** Procedure for Transporting Voting Equipment and Supplies

**Applicable Code Sections:** E.C. §§ 19322 and 19323.

**Purpose:** To ensure a secure method of transporting voting equipment.

**Policy:** The Registrar of Voters (ROV) shall utilize procedures set forth in this document in order to ensure a secure method of transporting voting system components to/from polling places.

**Procedure:**

Approximately 30 days prior to an election, ROV administration will enter to Agreements with transport companies for transporting voting equipment and polling place supplies to and from polling places. The ROV Internal Services Division will supervise and assist the transport companies in their transport operations using the following steps:

1. Each transport company will receive an assigned list of polling places including the location, address, equipment to be transported and the polling place contact person's name and phone number.
2. No sooner than 10 days prior to an election, the transport company will pick up the voting equipment and receive other instructions at the ROV. The Internal Services is responsible for:
  - Administering to the transport company personnel the Oath of Allegiance that he/she shall faithfully defend the integrity of the electoral process during the execution of his/her transporting duties and sign the Oath;
  - Directing the transport company personnel not to leave voting equipment in company trucks overnight (e.g., if a delivery attempt fails, the driver must return the voting equipment to the transport company to be locked up in a secure area until it can be delivered again);
  - Instructing the driver to safeguard voting equipment seals and to report to the ROV immediately if there is any breakage of a seal while transporting the equipment, or if he/she detects any evidence of tampering, or suspects tampering with any voting system component during any phase of delivery and transfer.

- Providing the written "Transport Company Instructions" to the transport company personnel, explaining the ROV expectations, and answering any questions;
  - Providing the "Equipment Delivery Receipt" form to be used by the transport company drivers. The "Equipment Delivery Receipt" is prepared by the ROV ahead of time and contains a list of the equipment to be delivered, the AVU number and the yellow strap padlock seal serial number which secures the AVU's hard plastic case.
3. The transport company is responsible for calling and coordinating the date and time of delivery with the polling place recipient prior to the delivery or pick up. In addition to the initial delivery schedule, it is recommended the transport company call no more than 48 hours in advance to remind the recipient of expected delivery date and time.

**Note:** The ROV will pay for up to 5% of redelivery and repick ups. The ROV will not pay for the cost of redelivery and repick ups exceeding the threshold of 5% unless the transport company can provide confirmation that they contacted the polling place within 48 hours before the scheduled delivery time to confirm drop off or pick up time.

4. Upon delivery of the voting equipment, the transport company driver will ask the recipient of the equipment to verify that the equipment is delivered as listed on the receipt, that the yellow strap padlock seal attached to the AVU's protective case is intact and the serial number is the same as the number printed on the receipt. The recipient of the equipment and the transport company will both verify and sign the Equipment Delivery Receipt Form.
5. Daily, after completion of deliveries, the transport company will fax to the ROV the signed Equipment Delivery Receipt forms to confirm scheduled deliveries.
6. Upon receiving the Equipment Delivery Receipts, the ROV will monitor and assess the delivery of equipment per the schedule and confirm that the transport of voting equipment was completed as scheduled in a safe and orderly manner.
7. After each election, the ROV will monitor the return of voting equipment by checking the returned items against the "Transfer Company Equipment Pickup/Return Log".

**Attachments:**

Equipment Delivery Receipt Form (including Oath of Allegiance)  
Transport Company Instructions  
Transfer Company Equipment Pickup/Return Log

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**REGISTRAR OF VOTERS  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE**



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**BARBARA DUNMORE  
REGISTRAR OF VOTERS**

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**DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES AND  
PROCEDURES**

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**Transport Company Instructions**

The transport company and personnel assigned to transporting voting equipment are required to adhere to the following instructions:

1. The Registrar of Voters (ROV) will provide all transport companies a listing of polling places, the precinct addresses and the contact person phone numbers. The transport company will use this information for contacting, scheduling and delivery of voting equipment.
2. Not earlier than E-10, transport company drivers will report to the ROV to pick up voting equipment for delivery.
3. Transport Company personnel shall vow to uphold the "Oath of Allegiance" to faithfully defend the integrity of the electoral process during the execution of his/her transporting duties. The "Oath of Allegiance" must be signed by the transport company personnel.
4. The transport company will be provided with a list of the Accessible Voting Units (AVU) and associated yellow strap padlock seal numbers attached to each AVU.
5. Each transport company is responsible to:
  - Safeguard voting equipment seals and report immediately if there is any breakage of a seal while transporting the equipment;
  - Contact the ROV immediately if he/she detects any evidence of tampering, or suspects tampering with any voting system component during any phase of delivery and transfer.
6. The transport company will ensure that the correct AVU is being delivered to the correct address.
7. Transport company personnel are required to utilize the "Equipment Delivery Receipt" form when delivering the voting equipment to the polling places. The "Equipment Delivery Receipt" is prepared by the ROV ahead of time and contains the polling places address, contact information, list of the equipment to be delivered, the AVU number and the yellow strap padlock seal number which is affixed to the AVU's hard plastic case.
8. Prior to the delivery of the equipment, the transport company is required to coordinate with and to notify the contact person (the recipient at the polling place) of delivery date

and time. It is acceptable to assign an approximate time for delivering the equipment or give a short window period, but not to exceed 4 hours.

9. The ROV will pay for up to 5% of redelivery and repick ups. The ROV will not pay for the cost of redelivery and repick ups exceeding the threshold of 5% unless the transport company can provide confirmation that they contacted polling site within 48 hours prior to the time of the scheduled drop off or pick up.
10. If the transport company neglects to notify the polling place reasonably ahead of time and is unable to deliver successfully due to lack of communication by the transport company, the transport company will not be compensated for the redelivery cost.
11. Upon delivery of the voting equipment, the transport company personnel will ask the recipient to verify that the equipment and the blue box are delivered as listed on the receipt; that the yellow strap padlock seal attached to the AVU protective case is intact, that the number on the yellow strap padlock seal is the same as the number printed on the receipt and have the recipient to verify and sign the receipt if all is correct.
12. Every evening, after completion of deliveries for that day, the transport company will fax to the ROV the signed Equipment Delivery Receipts to confirm completion of his/her scheduled deliveries.
13. The transport company will lock and secure trucks which contain AVUs at all times.

### **Post-Election Equipment Pick Instructions**

1. Post-Election Equipment Pick Up and delivery to the ROV should take place within 7 days after the Election Day (E+7).
2. The transport company will coordinate the date and time of equipment pick up prior to pick up.
  1. Transport personnel will complete and sign the Post-Election Equipment Pick Up section of the Equipment Delivery Receipt at the time of pick up.
  2. The transport company will provide to the ROV the original (or a copy of) completed "Equipment Delivery Receipt" prior to and post Election Day.

**Attachments:**      Equipment Delivery Receipt Form (including Oath of Allegiance)

# Transfer Company Equipment Pickup / Return Log

Consolidated Statewide Special

May 19th, 2009

## Golden West

#	Precinct	Edge #	Edge Picked Up	Date Picked Up	Edge Returned	Date Returned
<b>Pink</b>						
16	11-301	42017	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
19	11-402	42020	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
20	11-404	42021	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
22	11-414	42023	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
23	11-415	42024	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
36	11-500	42037	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
37	11-501	42038	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
39	11-510	42040	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
41	11-516	42042	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
44	11-525	42045	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
72	21-122	42073	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
73	21-123	42074	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
74	21-301	42075	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
75	21-304	42076	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
76	21-308	42077	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
77	21-312	42078	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
78	21-316	42079	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
79	21-319	42080	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	
80	21-320	42081	<input type="checkbox"/>	Tue 5/12	<input type="checkbox"/>	

# of Ballot Boxes: \_\_\_\_\_

Total number of Edges: **19**

# of Tables: \_\_\_\_\_

# of Voting Booths: \_\_\_\_\_

# of Chairs: \_\_\_\_\_

# of Accessible Booths: \_\_\_\_\_

Pick Up Signatures: \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_\_

Transfer Company (Sign and Print)

R.O.V. (Sign and Print)

Date

Return Signatures: \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_\_

Transfer Company (Sign and Print)

R.O.V. (Sign and Print)

Date



# Equipment Delivery Receipt

PRECINCT # - **11-861**

Delivery Address:

Contact: Fire Captain

Route Name Stop

Riverside County Fire Station # 82  
Lake Hills  
17452 Lakepointe Dr  
Riverside

Delivery  
Instructions:

### Equipment to be Delivered And Picked Up

AVU # -	41841	Chairs -	6	Blue Ballot Box -	1
Voting Booths -	4 Silver and 1 Gray	Tables-	2	Brown Cardboard Box -	1

### OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

The oath (affirmation) below is required of all individuals who, in the course of business, are provided access to Riverside County's voting systems.

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California; that I will faithfully defend the integrity of the electoral process through the conscientious execution of the duties entrusted to me; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter.

This section to be completed by the person receiving the voting equipment prior to election day. It is very important that all fields are completed and that the voting equipment is stored in a secured (out of sight) area and not be accessible to the public.

AVU Storage  
Location:

*Please describe the location where the voting machine will be stored until Election Day.*

Voting Booth  
Storage Location:

*Please describe the location where the voting booths will be stored until Election Day.*

Initial to confirm red AVU seal number: \_\_\_\_\_ \*41841\*

Initial to confirm blue ballot box is sealed \_\_\_\_\_

Receipt Signature:

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Signature is to confirm delivery.*

Date of delivery: \_\_\_\_\_

Printed Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Time of delivery: \_\_\_\_\_

### Post-Election Equipment Pick Up Information

Polling Place

Representative Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Pick Up: \_\_\_\_\_

Transfer Company

Representative Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Time of Pick Up: \_\_\_\_\_

Registrar of Voters  
County of Riverside



**Attachment E**

Barbara Dunmore  
*Registrar of Voters*

October 27, 2008

**TO:           PRECINCT INSPECTOR**

**FROM:       Barbara Dunmore**  
**Registrar of Voters**

**RE:           SUPPORTING WORKSHEET FOR BALLOT STATEMENT**

The attached Worksheet has been designed to assist your precinct board with completion of the Ballot Statement required as part of your closing duties on November 4, 2008. Use of the Worksheet is optional. The Worksheet is to be placed in the M-Z roster for your precinct and returned with the roster to the Registrar of Voters.

Thank you.

**November 4, 2008 Presidential Election**  
**Supporting Worksheet for Ballot Statement**  
*Optional Worksheet to assist with completion of the Ballot Statement*

Line            Type and location of data to be entered            Precinct # \_\_\_\_\_

**ELECTRONIC BALLOT SIGNATURE ACCOUNTING**            **Number of Signatures**

1	Signatures in Combined Roster and Index A-L (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters) of voters requesting to vote electronically	
2	Signatures in Combined Roster and Index M-Z (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters) of voters requesting to vote electronically	
3	Signatures in Curbside Voter Roster (M-Z pocket) of voters requesting to vote electronically	
4	Signatures in Authorized Voters Roster of voters requesting to vote electronically	
5	<b>Total SIGNATURES</b> (add lines 1 through 4) of voters requesting <b>TO VOTE ELECTRONICALLY</b>	

**PAPER BALLOT SIGNATURE ACCOUNTING**

6	Signatures in Combined Roster and Index A-L (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters) of voters requesting to vote using paper ballots	
7	Signatures in Combined Roster and Index M-Z (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters) of voters requesting to vote using paper ballots	
8	Signatures in Curbside Voter Roster (M-Z pocket) of voters requesting to vote using paper ballots	
9	Signatures in Authorized Voters Roster of voters requesting to vote using paper ballots	
10	<b>Total SIGNATURES</b> (add lines 6 through 9) of voters requesting <b>TO VOTE ON PAPER BALLOTS</b>	

**GRAND TOTAL**

11	<b>GRAND TOTAL</b> OF SIGNATURES OF VOTERS REQUESTING TO VOTE ON PAPER AND ELECTRONICALLY. ADD LINE 5 AND LINE 10 ABOVE (INSERT THIS NUMBER INTO THE LARGE WHITE BOX ON THE BALLOT STATEMENT)	
----	---	--

**PROVISIONAL BALLOT SIGNATURE ACCOUNTING**

12	Signatures in Paper Provisional Roster	
13	Signatures in Electronic Provisional Roster	
14	<b>Total Provisional Ballot Signatures</b>	

**RECONCILIATION**

<b>Difference</b>	- Subtract Line 5 from "Qualified Votes" at top of Ballot Statement (shaded in Pink)	
Explanation	_____	
<b>Difference</b>	- Subtract Line 10 from "number of Voted Ballots" toward the center of Ballot Statement	
Explanation	_____	
<b>Difference</b>	- Subtract Line 12 from "number of Blue Provisional envelopes (Voted)" near bottom of Ballot Stmt.	
Explanation	_____	
<b>Difference</b>	- Subtract Line 13 from number of Electronic "Provisional Votes" cast at top of Ballot Statement	
Explanation	_____	

Preparer's Name (Print) \_\_\_\_\_ Preparer's Signature \_\_\_\_\_

**BALLOT STATEMENT**  
(EC 14405)

**Attachment F**

Voting Unit #	OPTIONAL-Voting Equipment Security Log is the official chain of custody report	Qualified Votes	Provisional Votes	Total Votes
A	B	C	D	E
	Place Tamper-Evident Seal Here or in the Seals Bag.			

**REGULAR BALLOTS ISSUED**

<i>The Number of <u>Ballots</u> Issued</i>	F +
<i>The Number of additional ballots issued during the day</i>	G +
<b>Total available ballots to vote</b>	<b>H =</b>

<i>The number of <u>Unused</u> ballots (Place in White Box)</i>	I +
<i>The number of <u>Spoiled</u> ballots (Place the envelopes in the plastic bag and into White Box )</i>	J +
<i>The number of <u>Voted</u> ballots (Place in Brown Voted Ballot Box)</i>	K +
<b>Total</b>	<b>L =</b>

<b>Total Number of Electronic and Paper Regular ballot signatures in "Combined Roster and Index" A-L, M-Z. (Include signatures from the Supplemental Active Voter Roster List, Authorized Voter List, and Curbside Voters List)</b>	M
---	---

<b>Total number of "Qualified Votes" (Same as "C" from above)</b>	N +
<i>The number of <u>Voted</u> ballots (Same as "K" from above)</i>	O +
<b>Total</b>	<b>P =</b>

**PROVISIONAL BALLOTS ISSUED**

(EC 14405)

<i>The number of <u>Provisional Ballots Issued</u></i>	Q
--	---

<i>The number of <u>Provisional Unused ballots-Count</u> (Place in White Box)</i>	R +
<i>The number of <u>Spoiled</u> Provisional ballots (Place envelopes in plastic bag and into White Box )</i>	S +
<i>The number of <u>Voted</u> Provisional Ballots (Blue Envelopes) (Place in plastic bag and into Red Transport bag)</i>	T +
<b>Total</b>	<b>U =</b>

<b>The number of Dropped Off Vote-by-Mail ballots (Place in plastic bag and into Red Transport bag)</b>	V
---	---

For instructions on completing this form refer to your Election Officer Handbook.

Should Agree

Should Agree

Should Agree

**PLACE THE "YELLOW" COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT IN THE BROWN VOTED BALLOT CARTON.**

# Ballot Statement Instruction Sheet

- A** Copy Accessible Voting Unit (AVU) number
- B** Remove seal from the cartridge door and place here or in the Seals Bag
- C** Copy the numbers from the totals screen of the (AVU)
- D** Copy the numbers from the totals screen of the (AVU)
- E** Copy the numbers from the totals screen of the (AVU)
- F** Number of ballots that were issued to the Inspector at training
- G** Any additional ballots received from the Registrar of Voters office
- H** Add blocks F. and G, which equals the total number of ballots issued to the board
- I** Leftover ballots not used by voters
- J** Number of spoiled White envelopes (black ink) from the brown Ballot Box.
- K** Number of ballots removed from the Blue Ballot Box
- L** Add blocks I, J, and K. This block should agree with block H.
- M** Count all signatures in the Roster and Index A-L and M-Z, and in the Supplemental Active Voter Roster List, the Authorized Voter List, and the Curbside Voters List.
- N** Copy the same number from block C.
- O** Copy the same number from block K
- P** Add blocks N and O. This block should agree with block M.
- Q** This is the number of Provision Ballots issued to the Inspector at training.
- R** Leftover Provisional Ballots not issued to voters.
- S** Number of spoiled White envelopes (blue ink) from the brown Ballot Box.
- T** Number of voted Blue envelopes from the brown Ballot Box.
- U** Add blocks R, S, and T. This block should agree with block Q.
- V** Number of Vote-By-Mail Ballots dropped off by voters from the Brown Ballot Box.

**Please call the Registrar of Voters office if you have any questions on completing the Ballot Statement or any other documents at 1-877-663-9906.**

## INSPECTOR'S ELECTION CHECKLIST

Inspector, be sure to follow the checklist below to ensure that all the items listed have been completed. *In order to receive your additional \$15.00 stipend, you must CHECK each item and sign and print your name on the lines provided below. Your check mark on this document is your certification that these documents have been completed and signed.*

**ELECTION EVE**

VOTING EQUIPMENT SECURITY LOG (M-Z ROSTER)

**ELECTION MORNING**

DECLARATION OF ELECTIONS OFFICERS (OATH) (M-Z ROSTER)

ELECTION OFFICERS PAYROLL (M-Z ROSTER)

VOTING EQUIPMENT SECURITY LOG (M-Z ROSTER)

**ELECTION DAY**

VOTING EQUIPMENT SECURITY LOG (M-Z ROSTER) **RANGE INSPECTOR AND INSPECTOR MUST CHECK REQUIRED SEALS.**

**CLOSE OF POLLS**

VOTING EQUIPMENT SECURITY LOG (M-Z ROSTER)

BALLOT STATEMENT (M-Z ROSTER)

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION (M-Z ROSTER)

TAMPER PROOF SEAL ISSUED-VOTED BALLOT CONTAINER (SEALS BAG)

TAMPER PROOF SEAL UNUSED-BALLOT CONTAINER (SEALS BAG)

PRECINCT POSTING (SEALS BAG)

<b>For office use only</b>	
<i>Auditor, were the following items completed by the precinct Inspector?:</i>	
<b><u>ELECTION EVE:</u></b>	
VESL.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b><u>ELECTION MORNING:</u></b>	
DOFEO (OATH).....	<input type="checkbox"/>
EOP.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
VESL.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b><u>ELECTION DAY:</u></b>	
VESL.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b><u>CLOSE OF POLLS:</u></b>	
VESL.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
BS.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
COFC.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
TPSIVBC.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
TPSUBC.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
PP.....	<input type="checkbox"/>

INSPECTOR'S PRINTED NAME: \_\_\_\_\_ INSPECTOR'S SIGNATURE: \_\_\_\_\_



# Equipment Delivery Receipt

PRECINCT # - **37-716**

Delivery Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Contact: \_\_\_\_\_

Route Name Stop

Delivery  
Instructions:

## Equipment to be Delivered And Picked Up

AVU #:	Chairs:	Blue Ballot Box:	1
Voting Booths: 4 Silver and 1 Gray	Tables:	Brown Cardboard Box:	1

## OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

The oath (affirmation) below is required of all individuals who, in the course of business, are provided access to Riverside County's voting systems.

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California; that I will faithfully defend the integrity of the electoral process through the conscientious execution of the duties entrusted to me; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter.

This section to be completed by the person receiving the voting equipment prior to election day. It is very important that all fields are completed and that the voting equipment is stored in a secured (out of sight) area and not be accessible to the public.

AVU Storage  
Location:

\_\_\_\_\_

*Please describe the location where the voting machine will be stored until Election Day.*

Voting Booth  
Storage Location:

\_\_\_\_\_

*Please describe the location where the voting booths will be stored until Election Day.*

Initial to confirm red AVU seal number: \_\_\_\_\_

Initial to confirm blue ballot box is sealed: \_\_\_\_\_

Receipt Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

*Signature is to confirm delivery.*

Date of delivery: \_\_\_\_\_

Printed Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Time of delivery: \_\_\_\_\_

Transfer Company Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

*Signature is to confirm delivery.*

## Post-Election Equipment Pick Up Information

Polling Place

Representative Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Pick Up: \_\_\_\_\_

Transfer Company

Representative Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Time of Pick Up: \_\_\_\_\_

**REGISTRAR OF VOTERS  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE**



**BARBARA DUNMORE  
REGISTRAR OF VOTERS**

**DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES  
AND PROCEDURES**

**Section No. F-3**

Effective Date: October, 2006

Revision on Date: April, 2009

**Section:** Services and Internal Services

**Subject:** Collection Center- Election Night Procedures

**Applicable Code Sections:** E.C. §15260

**Purpose:** To transport and drop off voted ballots, Accessible Voting Unit (AVU) result cartridges and printers, red transport bags and unvoted ballots from the polling places to the Registrar of Voters on Election Night.

**Policy:** The Registrar of Voters shall establish one or more Election Night Collection Centers and follow the procedures listed in this document to collect and securely transport voted and unvoted ballots, AVU result cartridges and printers, and red transport bags to the ROV central counting site.

**Materials needed:** Equipments and Materials listed on the "Collection Center Equipment Checklist".

**Procedures:**

Collection Center Staff will arrive at the Collection Center around 7:30 p.m. and follow the procedure listed below:

**Survey Parking Area**

1. Position the U-Haul nearest to the door of the Collection Center. If vehicles or other objects are blocking the optimal unloading area, position the U-Haul as close to the Collection Center entrance as possible.
2. Place 42" orange pylons and string the barricade tape in the Collection Center unloading area to create an area for vehicle unloading. Two vehicles (end to end) should be able to unload simultaneously while poll workers remain in their vehicles.
3. Create a poll watcher observation area preferably along the driver's side of the poll workers vehicle so that the poll watchers may observe the unloading process.
4. Place Collection Center signage at the entrance of the facility. Make sure that the signage is visible to passing vehicles.

## **Path of Travel**

1. Set-up the 42" orange pylons and string them with barricade tape.
2. Create a poll watcher observation area along the pathway toward the Collection Center voted ballot carton and red bag receiving area. Make sure it does not interfere with election workers path of travel.
3. If necessary, set up halogen lights to illuminate the Collection Center pathway. If needed, use extension cords to provide power. **Do not** create a trip hazard.

## **Voted Ballot Carton and Red Bag Receiving Area**

1. Use the doorstops to prop open the Collection Center doors.
2. Remove the 2 folding chairs, 6' table and the tubs from the U-Haul and take them into the foyer of the Collection Center.
3. Place the 6' table inside the door jams and set the 2 chairs at the table on the inside of the building facing toward the Collection Center pathway.
4. Set the tubs inside the building in view of the election workers and poll watchers. Tubs must not be accessible to anyone outside the work area. **Do not** place the tubs under the table.
5. Use tub(s) for the voted ballot cartons and red transport bags.
6. Use separate tub(s) to separate voted ballot cartons with missing or broken seals and/or red bags with missing or broken seals.

## **Poll Watcher Observation Area**

Establish a poll watcher observation area outside the Collection Center voted ballot carton and red bag receiving area, allowing easy visibility of the storing of the voted ballot cartons and the red bags.

- All observers must be allowed to view the entire process.
- Be civil, but you're not required to answer any questions.
- Observers are not allowed to interfere with the process in anyway.
- If an observer becomes aggressive, do not argue with them. Notify the Collection Center Coordinator as soon as possible.

## **Payroll, badges, oath and vests**

1. Have all Collection Center volunteers sign the payroll.
2. Distribute the name badges and vests. **Name badges must be visible.**
3. Administer the Oath.
4. Enforcement of Riverside County Facilities use agreement:

- Use of all tobacco products is strictly prohibited. In accordance with state and federal law.
- Use of all alcohol products and or illegal drugs is strictly prohibited.
- Refrain from expressing personal opinion, beliefs, knowledge or judgment about any elected official, candidate or political party, while in the collection center.
- Avoid impropriety and/or appearance of impropriety at all times while performing electoral duties.
- Unsafe conduct or acts are strictly prohibited.

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### **Receiving (1 or 2 teams of 4 persons each)**

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Election Officers to remain in their vehicle.

1. Direct traffic to the Collection Center unloading area, preferably 2 vehicles at a time end to end.
2. Collection Center team members greet the Precinct Officers at the vehicle when they arrive and unload their vehicle.
3. One member of the team is the Collection Center Inspector and has the Collection Center Exception Log.
4. The other member of the team will have the Collection Center Custody Log.

### **Collection Team:**

1. **Takes custody** of the voted ballot cartons with the cartridge, un-voted ballot cartons, VVPATS, and red transport bag.
2. **Verifies the precinct number** of the voted ballot carton (which contains the results cartridge), un-voted ballot cartons, and red transport bag. If the precinct number is missing from the voted ballot carton, un-voted ballot carton or the red bag, then write the precinct number on the voted ballot carton (hinged end), un-voted ballot carton (hinged end) or insert the precinct number in the clear tag on the red bag handle.
3. **Verifies that the Tamper Proof Seal on the voted ballot carton is intact and the red transport bag is secured with a red plastic security chamber seal.** If the seals are broken or missing on the voted ballot carton or the red transport bag, the Collection Center Inspector and the Election Officer must fill out the Collection Center Exception Log for instruction (attached).
4. **Take the voted ballot carton and/or the red transport bag with the broken or missing seal to the receiving area and reseal with security tape.** Do not place security tape on top of the existing Tamper Proof Seal or the

precinct number on the voted ballot carton. If the red plastic security chamber seal is broken or missing on the red transport bag reseal the latch with security tape.

5. **Collection Center team member checks off all appropriate boxes** on the Collection Center Custody Log and has the Precinct Officer sign the Collection Center Custody Log. **This procedure is done at the vehicle.**
6. **Collection Center Inspector records the precinct and checks off all appropriate boxes** on the Collection Center Exception Log, makes any notes in the "other" section and then signs the Collection Center Exception Log along with the Precinct Officer. **This procedure is done at the vehicle.**
7. **Takes the voted ballot carton with the cartridge and red transport bag** to the voted ballot carton and red bag receiving area.
8. Places the un-voted ballot cartons and VVPATS into the U-Haul. Place VVPATS into the Gray Hard Storage containers with lids (6 VVPATS per container). Reseal any broken seals on un-voted ballot cartons with security tape. Do not cover the precinct number or seal with security tape. Log broken or missing seals on the Collection Center Exception Log.

**A team member should remain inside the truck to neatly stack materials.**

9. Poll worker vehicle departs.


#### **Voted Ballot Carton and Red Bag Receiving Team (1 team of 2 persons)**

1. A collection team member inspects the voted ballot carton and the red transport bag for broken seals. If a seal is broken or missing on the voted ballot carton it is then resealed with security tape. If the red plastic security chamber seal is broken or missing on the red transport bag the latch is resealed with security tape.
2. The voted ballot cartons are placed precinct number facing up into tubs.
3. Multiple voted ballot cartons **with the same precinct numbers are taped together with the security tape.** Do not tape over the precinct number or security seal.
4. The red transport bags are placed in tubs.
5. Voted ballot cartons sealed with security tape are placed together precinct number facing up into in separate tub(s).
6. Red transport bags sealed with security tape are placed in separate tub(s).
7. If loose ballots are returned to the Collection Center, the ballots should be placed inside a new ballot carton. The new ballot carton should be sealed with security tape. The precinct number should then be hand written on the outside of the new ballot carton in the same area as the other voted ballot cartons (on the hinged end of the carton). The new ballot carton should then be attached with security tape to the voted ballot carton of the same precinct if there is one returned from the precinct. Note the precinct number and explain the reason on the "other" section on the Collection Center Exception Log.

## BROKEN/MISSING SEALS

If a voted ballot carton, unvoted ballot carton, or red transport bag arrives at the Collection Center with a broken or missing seal:

1. Contact the Precinct Officers. Advise them of the broken or missing seal and determine why the seal is missing or broken.
2. Record the precinct number on the Collection Center Exception Log.
3. Locate the item that has a broken or missing seal, **VOTED** (for the voted ballots carton), **UNVOTED** (for the unvoted ballots carton), or **RED BAG** (for the red transport bag.)
4. In the column for the item, select the reason that the seal is missing or broken and check it. If none of the reasons listed describe the situation, use the **OTHER** line to describe why the seal is broken or missing.
5. Both the Precinct Officer and the Collection Center Inspector print and sign their names.



**COLLECTION CENTER EXCEPTION LOG**  
 CONSOLIDATED STATEWIDE SPECIAL ELECTION  
 MAY 19TH, 2009  
**RIVERSIDE COUNTY ADMIN CENTER—BLYTHE**

WHEN A SEAL IS FOUND MISSING/BROKEN CONTACT THE POLL WORKER AND DETERMINE THE REASON WHY THE SEAL IS MISSING OR BROKEN. CHECK THE APPROPRIATE EXPLANATION OR USE THE "OTHER" SECTION TO DESCRIBE

PRECINCT <u>47-006</u>	VOTED	UNVOTED	RED BAG	PRINTER
SEAL NOT PROPERLY APPLIED	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
SEAL NEVER APPLIED OR LOST	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
SEAL BROKEN AT POLLS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
SEAL BROKEN BY POLL WORKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
SEAL BROKEN IN TRANSIT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
SEAL CAME UNGLUED	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
PRINTER LEFT AT POLLING PLACE				<input type="checkbox"/>

**OTHER**

SIGNATURE BELOW ATTESTS THAT THE BALLOTS WERE NEVER OUT OF THE CONTROL OR CUSTODY OF THE SWORN AND DULY APPOINTED PRECINCT OFFICERS

PRECINCT OFFICER SIGNATURE	<u>Paula Folworker</u> <small>PRINT</small>	<u>Paula Folworker</u> <small>SIGN</small>
COLLECTION CENTER INSPECTOR	<u>Carl Collections</u> <small>PRINT</small>	<u>Carl Collections</u> <small>SIGN</small>

6. Apply security tape to seal the item.
7. If the item is a voted ballot carton, do not place security tape on top of the existing Tamper Proof Seal or the precinct number.
8. If the item is an unvoted ballot carton, do not place security tape on top of the existing Tamper Proof Seal or the precinct number.
9. If the red plastic security chamber seal on the red transport bag is broken or missing, reseal the latch with security tape.
10. Voted ballot cartons and red transport bags with security tape on them, must be

placed in a separate tub for special handling at the Registrar of Voters.

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### **Collection Center Closing Procedures**

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Call the ROV Collection Center Coordinator  
at **(951) 313-0699** or **(951) 313-0700**  
when leaving the Collection Center

**Collection Center Driver and Driver Assistant signs the last page of the Collection Center Custody Log. Collects the completed payroll, oaths, Collection Center Custody Log and Collection Center Exception Log and places them in the payroll envelope. Place them in the front seat of the U-Haul prior to closing of the Collection Center.**

1. Secure voted ballot cartons with the cartridge and the red transport bags and load into the U-Haul. **The voted ballot cartons with the cartridge and the red transport bags should be loaded onto the rear end of the U-Haul along with the Range Inspector kits. These voted ballot cartons and red transport bags in tubs come off of the truck first at the Counting Center.**
2. Collect all Collection Center signs, lights, extension cords, flashlights, pylons, vests, and miscellaneous equipment and load onto U-Haul. Clean up the area removing any trash and barricade tape.
3. Load the Range Inspector kits into the U-Haul and release the Range Inspector.
4. Notify facility personnel that the Collection Center operations have ended so they can begin to close the facility.
5. Once all equipment and elections supplies are accounted for lock the U-Haul and proceed to the Registrar of Voters. Delivery of Election Materials to ROV.

#### **Traffic Flow**

1. U-Hauls will arrive at the ROV at the walkway on the east side of the building (near the vacant lot).
2. An Election Night Assistant will meet the U-Haul and will take the voted ballot cartons with the cartridge and red transport bags and deliver the voted ballot cartons and cartridge to the designated table into the ROV Community Room. The red transport bags will be delivered to the ROV front counter.
3. Deliver the tub containing voted ballot cartons that were sealed with security tape to Community Room and alert ROV staff that these items were sealed at the Collection Center. Do the same when delivering red transport bags that were sealed with security tape to the front counter.
4. U-Hauls will continue around to the back of the ROV to the loading dock and drop off the un-voted ballot cartons, VVPATS, Collection Center supply tubs and Range Inspector kits.
5. **Stay with your U-Haul until it is unloaded. After unloading is complete park your U-Haul. Be sure to turn in your vehicle keys, pad locks**

**(with keys), cell phone, signed payroll sheet, signed Collection Center Custody Log, and signed Collection Center Exception Log to the ROV Collection Center Coordinator. U-Haul drivers are required to shuttle assigned U-Haul back to U-Haul for drop off.**

- 6. You are encouraged to remain and help unload other trucks. You must wear your ROV issued election badge to work on the back dock.**

**ROV Collection Center Supplemental Procedures  
(Warehouse and Loading Dock of ROV)**

Collection Team members greet the driver of the U-Haul as they arrive and proceed to unload the U-Haul.

**Collection Team:**

1. Unloads the un-voted ballot cartons, VVPATS, and Range Inspector kits from the U-haul trucks.
2. Un-voted ballot cartons are palletized with precinct number facing out.
3. VVPATS are brought inside the warehouse.
4. Range Inspector kits are brought inside the warehouse.
5. U-Haul drivers will check in the signed pay roll, signed Collection Center Custody Log, and signed Collection Center Exception Log, cell phone, charger, keys and locks to the Dock Supervisor. The Dock Supervisor will log the Collection Center Dock Log and have the Collection Center Driver sign the log upon returning the Collection Center payroll.
6. U-Haul Trucks are returned to U-Haul after the trucks have been emptied and cleaned.
7. Drivers will be shuttled back to ROV by a shuttle bus.

**Collection Center Equipment Checklist**

Quantity	Item
<input type="checkbox"/> 8	42" Orange Pylons w/two 3" reflective collars and eight/12 lb. rubber bases
<input type="checkbox"/> 1	Roll of red barricade tape with a pair of scissors
<input type="checkbox"/>	Tubs, (10) red transport bags per tub (5) voted ballot cartons per tub
<input type="checkbox"/>	Gray VVPATS hard Plastic Storage container (6) VVPATS per container

Quantity		Item
<input type="checkbox"/>	4	Clipboards
<input type="checkbox"/>	1	Book Light
<input type="checkbox"/>		Cell Phone(s) & Charger(s)
<input type="checkbox"/>	1	12 Pack of Pens
<input type="checkbox"/>		Collection Center Custody Log
<input type="checkbox"/>		Collection Center Exception Log
<input type="checkbox"/>	1	Phone List of Emergency Numbers + Contact Persons
<input type="checkbox"/>		Keys and Lock to U-Haul Truck
<input type="checkbox"/>	4	Flashlights w/Batteries
<input type="checkbox"/>	2	Lighted Safety Wands w/Batteries
<input type="checkbox"/>	1	Halogen Lights
<input type="checkbox"/>	2	Extension Cords (100')
<input type="checkbox"/>	1	Collection Center Map
<input type="checkbox"/>	1	Procedures for Collection Center Activities
<input type="checkbox"/>		Badges w/Names of Collection Center Workers
<input type="checkbox"/>		Payroll & Oath
<input type="checkbox"/>		Vests (varies by Collection Center)
<input type="checkbox"/>	1	Election Collection Center w/Signs & Legs
<input type="checkbox"/>		U-Haul Truck
<input type="checkbox"/>	1	Table (6')
<input type="checkbox"/>	2	Folding Chairs
<input type="checkbox"/>	2	Doorstops
<input type="checkbox"/>	1	Rope (50' rolls)
<input type="checkbox"/>		Hand Trucks (1 or 2, varies by Collection Center)
<input type="checkbox"/>		Security Tape with Dispenser
<input type="checkbox"/>		New Ballot Cartons (varies by Collection Center)
<input type="checkbox"/>	1	Disposable Camera

**Attachment:** Collection Center Exception Log



# Collection Center Exception Log

Consolidated Election

November 3rd, 2009

*When a seal is found missing/broken contact the poll worker and determine the reason why the seal is missing or broken. Check the appropriate explanation or use the "other" section to describe.*

Precinct _____	Voted	Unvoted	Red Bag	Printer
Seal not properly applied	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Seal never applied or lost	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Seal broken at polls	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Seal broken by poll worker	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Seal broken in transit	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Seal came unglued	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Printer left at Polling Place				<input type="checkbox"/>

*other*

*Signature below attests that the ballots were never out of the control or custody of the sworn and duly appointed precinct officers*

Precinct Officer Signature \_\_\_\_\_

*Print*

*Sign*

Collection Center Inspector \_\_\_\_\_

*Print*

*Sign*

*When a seal is found missing/broken contact the poll worker and determine the reason why the seal is missing or broken. Check the appropriate explanation or use the "other" section to describe.*

Precinct _____	Voted	Unvoted	Red Bag	Printer
Seal not properly applied	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Seal never applied or lost	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Seal broken at polls	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Seal broken by poll worker	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Seal broken in transit	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Seal came unglued	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
Printer left at Polling Place				<input type="checkbox"/>

*other*

*Signature below attests that the ballots were never out of the control or custody of the sworn and duly appointed precinct officers*

Precinct Officer Signature \_\_\_\_\_

*Print*

*Sign*

Collection Center Inspector \_\_\_\_\_

*Print*

*Sign*

REGISTRAR OF VOTERS  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE



BARBARA DUNMORE  
REGISTRAR OF VOTERS

DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES  
AND PROCEDURES

**Section No. F-10**

Effective Date: May, 2006

Revision Date: April, 2009

**Section:** Internal Services and Canvass

**Subject:** Receipt and Processing of Red Transport Bags

**Applicable Code Section:** E.C. §§14432, 14434, 14435

**Purpose:** To receive and assume custody of red transport bags containing voting and precinct related materials.

**Policy:** In accordance with Elections Code, red transport bags contain election related materials are to be delivered to the Registrar of Voters (ROV) in sealed packages. Red transport bags will be inspected for intact seals.

**Procedure:**

The procedure for receipt and processing of red transport bags is as follows:

1. One or more processing teams will be assigned to receive, log and examine that the red transport bags' chamber seals are securely in place when they arrive at the ROV.
2. Upon receipt, the processing team will log in the receipt by checking them off on the Precinct Check Off list for the Red Transport Bags received at the Registrar of Voters Office" and will check off if a bag is sealed, resealed, not sealed, or has a broken seal.
3. Red transport bags received with security chamber seals intact will be placed in the precinct order for post-Election Day processing.
4. Red transport bags received with a missing or broken chamber seal, including those resealed at collection centers, will be set aside, opened, and inventoried on Election Night as explained under the Processing resealed red transport bags or bags with broken or missing chamber seals.
5. During canvass, ROV staff will open the sealed red transport bags and perform the following:
  - a. Remove provisional ballot envelopes and vote-by-mail ballot envelopes returned at the polls and forward them to the appropriate section for processing;
  - b. Remove and sort combined rosters and indexes and any other election related materials and forward them to the appropriate section for further processing.

**Processing resealed red transport bags or bags with broken or missing chamber seals:**

- a. Resealed red transport bag and/or bags with broken or missing security chamber seals are set aside to be opened by a Special Inspection team on Election Night. The Special Inspection team will:
  - 1) Open each red bag and check its contents against the Red Transport Bag Exceptions Inspection Log. If all items are present and no additional items are in the bag, the bag will be placed in precinct order for canvass processing.
  - 2) If a required item(s) is not present in the bag, the Special Inspection team will check off the appropriate box on the Red Transport Bag Exceptions Inspection Log; search for the missing item(s) and describe any actions taken to locate the missing item(s).
  - 3) When the item(s) is found, the Special Inspection team will document it on the Red Transport Bag Exceptions Inspection Log and forward the items to the appropriate section for processing.
  - 4) If the missing item(s) is not found, the Special Inspection team, will inform ROV management who will take necessary actions (dependent on the circumstances) to further research the chain of custody including interviewing staff, precinct board members, volunteer, and polling facility managers, where warranted.
  - 5) The management staff will also document the results (of further research) on the Red Transport Bag Exceptions Inspection Log.
- b. After the canvass, Red Transport Bag Exceptions Inspection Logs will be filed in precinct order and the information will be utilized for training Collection and Election officers.

**Note:** ROV shall make arrangements for public to observe the receipt and opening of the red transport bags should there be any request by public to observe the process.

**2 Attachments:**

- 1-Precinct Check off List for Red Transport Bags Received at the ROV
- 2-Red Transport Bag Exceptions Inspection Log



**PRECINCT CHECK OFF LIST  
FOR RED TRANSPORT BAGS RECEIVED  
AT THE REGISTRAR OF VOTERS OFFICE**

**Consolidated Statewide Special Election  
May 19, 2009**

Voting Precinct	Red Transport Bags					
	Sealed	Not Sealed	Re-Sealed	Broken Seal	Time	Initials
0011104	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011111	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011115	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011201	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011203	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011204	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011205	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011208	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011210	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011218	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011219	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011222	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011224	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011225	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011301	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011307	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011308	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011402	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011409	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011414	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011415	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011418	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011420	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011421	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		



# RED TRANSPORT BAG EXCEPTIONS INSPECTION LOG

Consolidated Statewide Special Election  
May 19, 2009

Precinct Number: \_\_\_\_\_

## RED TRANSPORT BAG CONTENTS

## PRESENT

## NOT PRESENT

A – L Roster	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
M – Z Roster	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Electronic Provisional Roster	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Paper Provisional Ballots	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Vote-by-Mail Ballots	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

If any of the above item(s) are missing please describe below the action taken to locate the item(s):

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If extra items were contained in the red transport bag please list them below and what action was taken:

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REGISTRAR OF VOTERS  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE



BARBARA DUNMORE  
REGISTRAR OF VOTERS

DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES  
AND PROCEDURES

**Section No. F-21**

Effective Date: May, 2008

Revision Date: April, 2009

**Section:** Election Night Tabulation

**Subject:** Ballot Intake Procedures

**Applicable Code Sections:** E.C. §14400 et seq

**Purpose:** To receive, account for and prepare Election Day paper ballots for tabulation.

**Policy:** On Election Night, the Registrar of Voters receives ballots and cartridges from all precincts and prepares them for tabulation in an efficient manner to expedite the Election Night count.

**Materials needed:** Laptop and Excel spreadsheet for VBM and Provisional, precinct listing log, blank BPAF, "In" box for Ballot Statements, slicing device to open boxes.

**Procedures:**

Under direction of the Registrar of Voters and the Assistant Registrar, ROV managers shall assign and supervise staff and volunteers in three functional teams: "Unloading", "Receiving" and "Verifying". Unloading Team will unload ballot boxes returned from the collection centers; Receiving Team will receive and log in ballot boxes returned from the collection centers, Verifying Team will open the voted ballot box and verify the presence of voted ballots, AVU results cartridge, and the Ballot Statement Form.

More than one team may be assigned to each function; the number of assigned teams will be determined based on type and size of each election. Following steps are utilized when voted ballots cartons are taken in on Election Night:

1. "Unloading" teams will remove ballot boxes from the vehicles as soon as they arrive at the ROV from collection centers and take the ballot boxes directly to the "Receiving" team.
2. The "Receiving" team will receive and manually log the receipt of each ballot box on the "Precinct Check Off List for the Ballot Cartons Received at the Registrar of Voters Office". The Receiver will check the appropriate boxes on the Precinct Check Off list

and indicate if a voted ballot carton received is sealed, not sealed, re-sealed or has a broken seal. The Receiver will put time and his/her initials on the Precinct Check Off List and forward the sealed voted ballot boxes to the "Verifying" team. If a box is resealed or has a broken seal or is not sealed the procedure listed under the **In-take of Resealed Ballot Boxes or Ballot Boxes with Broken or Missing Seals** will be utilized.

3. The "Verifying" team will break the seal and open the ballot box and carefully perform the following tasks:
  - Verify the presence of voted ballots, AVU results cartridge and the Ballot Statement form.
  - Locate the Ballot Statement and quickly verify the number of ballots.
  - Retain the Ballot Statement and prepare (complete) Ballot Processing Audit Form (BPAF) by writing the header number, precinct number and the number of ballots to be counted from the Ballot Statement.
  - Set the Ballot Statement aside in the tray and place the BPAF in the box containing the ballots and send the box to the Inspection Team for further processing. See "Paper Ballot Inspection Procedure", No. F-22 for more information.
  - If the result cartridge, Ballot statement or voted ballots are missing, the verifier will inform the supervisor on site.
  - If the box contains items other than voted ballot, result cartridge and the Ballot Statement, the verifier will set the box aside and inform the supervisor on site.
  - If time allows, log the number of "Vote- by- Mail" and "Provisional" ballots recorded on the Ballot Statement Form into an Excel spread sheet.
4. The supervisor will assign the voted ballot boxes which are missing an item (e.g., voted ballots, AVU results cartridge and the Ballot Statement form) or boxes which contain extra items of special significance to "Special Inspection" team for further process.
5. The Special Inspection team will list missing items or extra items of a box on the "Voted Ballot Carton Exception Inspection Log" and document any relevant information on the Log.

**In-take of Resealed Ballot Boxes or Ballot Boxes with Broken or Missing Seals**


- Any voted ballot box which is resealed or has a broken seal or is missing a seal, will be set aside by the Verification team and will be inspected by a "Special Inspection" team.
- The Special Inspection team will examine the contents of the ballot box and complete the "Voted Ballot Carton Exception Inspection Log" by checking off the items found in the box and/or listing extra items contained in the box on the appropriate sections provided on the log and perform the following:

- Will send extra items found in the box to appropriate ROV divisions for further process and list actions taken on the "Voted Ballot Carton Exception Inspection Log".
  - Search the precinct's red transport bag for the missing item(s). When item(s) found, will note it on the "Voted Ballot Carton Exception Inspection Log" and forward item (s) found to appropriate section for further process.
  - If the Special Inspection team can not find the missing item(s), will inform the ROV management. The ROV management staff will take necessary actions (depending on the circumstances) to further research the chain of custody (by contacting the volunteers, staff, etc. and reviewing control documents) to find the missing item(s). Management will note the search result in the Ballot Box Content Log regardless of recovering or not recovering the missing items.
- After the canvass, completed Voted Ballot Carton Exception Inspection Logs will be filed by the Election date and the information will be utilized for statistical and Election Officers training purposes.

**2 Attachments:**

- 1- Precinct Check off List for the Ballot Cartons Received at the Registrar of Voters Office
- 2- Voted Ballot Carton Exception Inspection Log

## Procedure Flowchart



## Flowchart Detail

Step	Task	Description	Resource	Location	Predecessors
1.0	Ballot Check In	This is the procedure for receiving and preparing Election Day paper ballots for tally.			
1.1	Collection Center Check-in	Ballot Boxes are removed from vehicles by the unloading team and checked-in by precinct.	Collection Center Teams	Various	
1.2	The Ballot Box sent to Receiving Team	The ballot boxes are taken directly to the Receiving Team as soon as they arrive at the ROV Offices.	Runners	Meeting Room, Station #1	1.1
1.3	Ballot Boxes Logged	The receipt of the box is logged manually.	Receiving Team	Meeting Room, Station #1	1.2
1.4	Ballot Box sent to Verification Team	The Receiving Team forwards the Ballot Box to the Verification Team	Receiving Team	Meeting Room, Station #2	1.3
1.5	Ballot Box opened	The Verification Team opens the box and verifies presence of ballots and Edge cartridge.	Verification Team	Meeting Room, Station #2	1.4
1.6	Ballot Statement verified	The Ballot Statement is located, checked and the number of ballots is quickly verified. A Ballot Processing Audit Form (BPAF) is prepared for that precinct and placed in the box. The ballot statement is retained.	Verification Team	Meeting Room, Station #2	1.5
1.7	AB and Provisional ballots Stats	Using the Ballot Statement, the quantities of Vote-by-Mail ballots and provisional ballots are updated in a spreadsheet as workflow permits.	Verification Team	Meeting Room, Station #2	1.6
1.8	Eday ballots and BPAF to Inspection Team	The box containing ballots, cartridges and the BPAF are sent to the on for further processing.	Runners	Meeting Room, Station #3	1.6

**Receiving Team Task Checklist**

1. Check off the precinct number on the Precinct Log. Indicate whether or not the box is sealed, re-sealed, missing the seal, or seal is broken.
2. Send or stage the box to the Verification Team or Special Inspection Team for further processing.

### **Verification Team Task Checklist**

1. Break the seal and open the Ballot Box.
2. Remove the ballots and the Edge Cartridge.
3. Find the Ballot Statement and quickly verify the number of ballots.
4. Report discrepancies and missing Edge cartridges to the Supervisor.
5. Return the ballots and cartridge to the box.
6. Prepare Ballot Processing Audit Form (BPAF) by writing the precinct number and the number of ballots to be counted from the Ballot Statement.
7. Set the Ballot Statement aside in the tray.
8. Place the BPAF into the box containing the ballots.
9. Send the box to the Inspection Team for further processing.
10. WHEN TIME ALLOWS, log the number of provisional ballots and VBM ballots recorded on the Ballot Statement into an Excel spreadsheet.



**PRECINCT CHECK OFF LIST  
FOR BALLOT CARTONS RECEIVED  
AT THE REGISTRAR OF VOTERS OFFICE**

**Consolidated Statewide Special Election  
May 19, 2009**

Voting Precinct	Voted Ballot Carton					
	Sealed	Not Sealed	Re-Sealed	Broken Seal	Time	Initials
0011104	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011111	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011115	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011201	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011203	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011204	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011205	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011208	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011210	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011218	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011219	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011222	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011224	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011225	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011301	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011307	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011308	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011402	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011404	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011409	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011414	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011415	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011418	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011420	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
0011421	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		



# VOTED BALLOT CARTON EXCEPTIONS INSPECTION LOG

Consolidated Statewide Special Election  
May 19, 2009

Precinct Number: \_\_\_\_\_

VOTED BALLOT CARTON CONTENTS	PRESENT	NOT PRESENT
AVU Results Cartridge	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ballot Statement	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Voted Ballots	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

If any of the above item(s) are missing please describe below the action taken to locate the item(s):

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If extra items were contained in the voted ballot carton please list them below and what action was taken:

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
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**REAPPROVAL CONDITIONS RATED AS LESS THAN COMPLIANT BY REVIEW.**



**SECRETARY OF STATE**

**WITHDRAWAL OF APPROVAL OF  
SEQUOIA VOTING SYSTEMS, INC.,  
WINEDS V 3.1.012/AVC EDGE/INSIGHT/OPTECH 400-C  
DRE & OPTICAL SCAN VOTING SYSTEM  
AND CONDITIONAL RE-APPROVAL OF  
USE OF SEQUOIA VOTING SYSTEMS, INC.,  
WINEDS V 3.1.012/AVC EDGE/INSIGHT/OPTECH 400-C  
DRE & OPTICAL SCAN VOTING SYSTEM  
(October 25,2007 Revision)**

12. Within 45 days of the original issuance of this document on August 3,2007, the vendor, working with elections officials, must develop and submit to the Secretary of State for approval, detailed requirements and Use Procedures for programming, pre- and post-election logic and accuracy testing, transporting and operating voting equipment that will prevent or detect unauthorized access to or modification of any component of the voting system, including, but not limited to:
- Chain of custody controls and signature-verified documentation;
  - Requirements for secure interim storage of any system component; and
  - Employment of mechanisms to detect unauthorized access to the equipment.

Following meetings with vendor and county representatives in the period from September 28,2007, through October 5,2007, the Secretary of State has determined that, at a minimum, the Use Procedures must require the jurisdiction to secure all voting system components in one or more uniquely serialized, tamper-evident container(s) before the jurisdiction transfers them to the custody of an Inspector, other poll worker, drayage company or other intermediary, or before jurisdiction personnel deliver them to a secure polling place or secure

satellite distribution facility, as the case may be. Transportation of voting system components to the custody of an Inspector, other poll worker, drayage company or other intermediary, secure polling place, or secure satellite distribution facility shall not occur earlier than 10 calendar days prior to Election Day. Electronic components of a voting system not transported back to the jurisdiction headquarters on election night must be secured in one or more uniquely serialized, tamper-evident container(s) and placed in secured storage. The Use Procedures must impose the same requirements for signed logging of the inspection of security containers and the removal and return of voting system components to security containers that apply to security seals and locks on the voting system components themselves. The following are examples of acceptable tamper evident containers:

- A uniquely serialized, sealed banker's bag;
- A zippered nylon or canvass bag or case on which the zipper(s) that prevent access to the voting system component(s) inside are kept closed by a uniquely serialized, tamper-evident lock; or
- A hard lid that blocks access to all doors, ports or other points of access to the inside of the voting system component(s) and that is held in place by a latch or latches closed with a uniquely serialized, tamper-evident lock or locks.

The Use Procedures must also require a minimum of two elections officials or poll workers to perform or directly observe critical security processes, such as sealing and locking equipment for transport, conducting logic and accuracy testing, verifying the integrity and authenticity of security locks and seals, setting up voting equipment, opening the polls, closing the polls and printing results.

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14. Upon request, members of the public must be permitted to observe and inspect, without physical contact, the integrity of all externally visible security seals used to secure voting equipment in a time and manner that does not interfere with the conduct of the election or the privacy of any voter.
  15. Where voting equipment is used to record and tabulate vote results in a polling place, upon close of the polls, the poll workers are required to print two copies of the accumulated vote results and one audit log from each device. Each poll worker must sign every copy. One copy of the vote results from each device must be publicly posted outside the polling place. The second copy, along with the audit log, must be included with the official election material that is returned to the jurisdiction headquarters on election night.

With respect to votes that are recorded and tabulated on an Edge Model I or 11, a jurisdiction may satisfy this requirement by causing the Edge unit to display the summary vote results and then manually transcribing these results to a reporting form created for this purpose. The transcribing of summary vote results must be observed and the accuracy verified by two or more persons, in accordance with the Secretary of State approved procedures for this process. Two transcription copies must be made and signed by all poll workers. One of these copies is to be posted publicly at the polling place and the second copy must be returned to the jurisdiction headquarters on election night.

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19. Any post-election auditing requirements imposed as a condition of this certification shall be paid for by the vendor. Elections officials are required to conduct the audits and the vendor is required to reimburse the jurisdiction.
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21. Elections officials are required to conduct a 100% manual tally, by the process described in Elections Code section 15360, of the electronic results tabulated on each DRE machine in use on Election Day. Notice to the public of this manual tally may be combined with the notice required by any other manual tally required in this order or by Elections Code section 15360.
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24. Elections officials must develop appropriate security procedures for use when representatives of qualified political parties and bona fide associations of citizens and media associations, pursuant to their rights under Elections Code section 15004, check and review the preparation and operation of vote tabulating devices and attend any or all phases of the election. The security procedures must permit representatives to observe at a legible distance the contents of the display on the vote tabulating computer or device. This requirement may be satisfied by positioning an additional display monitor or monitors in a manner that allows the representatives to read the contents displayed on the vote tabulating computer or device while also observing the vote tabulating computer or device and any person or persons operating the vote tabulating computer or device.
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27. With respect to any piece of voting equipment for which the chain of custody has been compromised or for which the integrity of the tamper-evident seals has been compromised, the following actions must be taken:
- The chief elections official of the jurisdiction must be notified immediately;
  - The equipment must be removed from service immediately and replaced if possible;
  - Any votes cast on the device prior to its removal from service must be subject to a 100% manual tally, by the process described in Elections Code section 15360, as part of the official canvass. Notice to the public of this manual tally may be combined with the notice required by any other manual tally required in this order or by Elections Code section 15360;
  - Any memory card containing data from that device must be secured and retained for the full election retention period;
  - An image of all device software and firmware must be stored on write-once media and retained securely for the full election retention period; and
  - All device software and firmware must be reinstalled from a read-only version of the approved firmware and software supplied directly by the federal testing laboratory or the Secretary of State before the equipment is placed back into service.
28. If a voting device experiences a fatal error from which it cannot recover gracefully (i.e., the error is not handled through the device's internal error handling procedures with or without user input), such that the device must be rebooted or the device reboots itself to restore operation, the following actions must be taken:
- The chief elections official of the jurisdiction must be notified immediately;

- The equipment must be removed from service immediately and replaced as soon as possible;
- Any votes cast on the device prior to its removal from service must be subject to a 100% manual tally, by the process described in Elections Code section 15360, over and above the normal manual tally conducted during the official canvass as defined in Elections Code section 336.5. Notice to the public of this manual tally may be combined with the notice required by any other manual tally required in this order or by Elections Code section 15360;
- Any memory card containing data from that device must be secured and retained for the full election retention period;
- An image of all device software and firmware must be stored on write-once media and retained securely for the full election retention period;
- The vendor or jurisdiction shall provide an analysis of the cause of the failure;
- Upon request by the Secretary of State, the vendor or jurisdiction shall retain the device for a reasonable period of time to permit forensic analysis; and
- All device software and firmware must be reinstalled from a read-only version of the approved firmware and software supplied directly by the federal testing laboratory or the Secretary of State before the equipment is placed back into service



REGISTRAR OF VOTERS  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE

Attachment M

BARBARA DUNMORE  
REGISTRAR OF VOTERS

DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES  
AND PROCEDURES

**Section No. D-20**

Effective Date: July, 2009

Revision date:

**Section:** Internal Services

**Subject:** Software/Firmware Verification

**Purpose:** To be in compliance with Conditions of Recertification #27 and #28 and the California Use Procedures as approved by the Secretary of State.

**Policy:** Per the California Use Procedures, software/firmware verification will be verified for any repair that breaks a permanent seal or in the event of a fatal error. A fatal error is defined as any error where the device must be rebooted to restore operation or the devices reboots itself.

Software/Firmware verification will be performed in accordance with Appendix P, Software Verification Procedures, and California Use Procedures.

**Procedure:**

The Compact Flash in the Accessible Voting Unit is the main boot device where the operating system resides, election software, and the audit trail memory resides.

The software verification procedure consists of extracting the voting machine Compact Flash memory for each unit to be verified, computing the SHA-512 (Secure Hash Algorithm) digest for all files in the Compact Flash, and comparing the previously computed Secure Hash digest values registered in the maintenance database.

**Routine Maintenance Procedures:**

1. Remove the Compact Flash memory the Accessible Voting Unit, verifying the tamper evident seals with the equipment seal log.
2. Insert the Compact Flash memory into the PC Reader and generate a SHA-512 Secure Hash listing of all files.
3. Compare the list generated with the maintenance database. The Secure Hash digest must match for all files in order to validate the software verification.
4. Record the results of the HASH check for input into the maintenance database.
5. Reinsert the Compact Flash or Insight chips into the unit.
6. Replace security seals with new ones, logging these on the equipment seal log.

**Election Day or Early Voting Fatal Error Procedures:**

1. The Registrar of Voters will be notified as soon as possible.
2. If the Accessible Voting Unit is being used for Early Voting or on Election Day, the AVU will be removed from service immediately and replaced as soon as possible.

3. Any ballots cast will be verified through existing manual tally procedures.
4. Verify all tamper-evident seals with the equipment seal log, recording any differences, if any exist.
5. Remove the results cartridge from the AVU and secure in a plastic case with a tamper evident seal.
6. Remove the Compact Flash memory from the Accessible Voting Unit.
7. Insert the Compact Flash memory into the PC Reader and generate a SHA-512 Secure Hash listing of all files.
8. Secure the Compact Flash memory in a plastic case with a tamper evident seal.
9. Write a copy of all Compact Flash memory files and the SHA-512 Secure Hash list to CD-ROM. Secure the CD-ROM in a plastic case with a tamper evident seal.
10. The compact flash memory, results cartridge, CD-ROM and VVPAT print-out will be secured together and retained for the full election period, as defined by applicable law, or as directed by the Registrar of Voters.